[kictanet] Threat analysis of WCIT part 2: Telecommunications vs. Internet

[Walubengo J]

Found this piece interesting with regard to the ITU Regulatory moves.

http://tinyurl.com/6r5g64e

The Author actually turns the whole debate around with this sentence:

"...But it would be wrong, and a bit silly, to talk about the ITU “taking over” the Internet (**this has been my view all along**) . It is, rather, the Internet that is taking over the world of telecommunications, setting more and more of the terms and conditions under which the ITU and its operating entities function."

Interesting.

walu. 
~~~
June 7, 2012
								
									Threat analysis of WCIT part 2: Telecommunications vs. Internet
							
		
			
				To
understand what is really happening at the International
Telecommunication Union’s WCIT, one must return to an old question: is
the Internet “telecommunications” or is it something else? That
seemingly obscure definitional question has been at the center of
communication and information policy since the mid-1960s and it – not a
“UN takeover of the Internet” – should be the point of departure for
understanding WCIT.
More than 50 years ago, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission
decided that basic telecommunications (which in the 1960s-70s was
dominated by the AT&T monopoly) needed to be strictly regulated,
while “enhanced” services (i.e., the emerging networked computer
services industry that relied on the public telephone network) needed
to be opened up and deregulated. To facilitate this policy goal, the
FCC created a regulatory distinction between “basic” and “enhanced”
services. Telecommunication was straight transmission of signals while
“enhanced service” added some “information processing” to
telecommunications transmission.
At that time traditional telecommunication (layers 1 physical and 2 data link of the OSI model of data communications),
was provided by highly restrictive, protected and usually state-owned
monopolies known as PTTs (postal, telephone and telegraph monopolies).
By placing information services in a separate regulatory/legal
category, information service providers could (when other countries
agreed) ride unmolested on that telecommunications infrastructure,
without being subject to all the entry restrictions and gatekeeping
regulations of the telephone companies and/or their governments. During
the 1980s and 1990s, many countries were more than happy to open up
that tiny “information services” market a bit in exchange for continued
protection of their gigantic voice telephony markets from foreign
competition.
The separation of “telecommunications” and “information services”
paved the way for an open, economically and politically free Internet.
Internet protocol was basically software, and thus could be considered
an “information processing” or “enhanced” service. And so when the
Internet went viral in the early 1990s, it spread like rhizomes into
the global path cleared for it by the international deregulation of
information services.
From the 1980s on, layer 1-2 telecommunications services were
liberalized as well. New competitors were allowed to enter the market
worldwide. The public infrastructure became more diverse. State-owned
PTTs were privatized. Many prices and features were deregulated. Mobile
networks became substitutes for fixed networks. As the industry became
more diverse and competitive, maintaining a clear, simple distinction
between telecommunications and information services became complicated.
The combination of Moore’s law and expanding bandwidth allowed the
application layer to provide services “over the top” that were
substitutes for the offerings of traditional telecommunications and
broadcasting networks, such as Internet telephony (VoIP), video
streaming, or instant messaging. Instead of a single monopoly platform
hosting thousands of services, we got multiple telecom platforms with
multiple services. It was difficult if not impossible to keep the
service providers out of telecom platforms – and vice-versa.
The ensuing debate between those favoring a free market,
contractually-based, deregulated Internet model and those who wanted
regulators to preserve the Internet of the 1990s by treating ISPs as
regulated common carriers turned – once again – on the
telecommunications-information distinction. The distinction was
reaffirmed in 2005, when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the Powell FCC’s classification of cable modem Internet as an
“information service.” Net neutrality advocates in the U.S. hated that
decision, because classifying ISPs as “information services” instead of
“telecommunications” released them from common carrier-style
regulation. But it did keep network operators exempt from many
potentially debilitating forms of political and regulatory
intervention, especially around interconnection arrangements.
So what does all this have to do with the WCIT and the ITRs? It is
this: the ITU’s attempt to update the International Telecommunication
Regulations (ITRs) is a new attempt to negotiate the boundaries between
telecommunications and information services. Just as in the Brand X
case, if certain things are defined as telecommunication they can be
subject to certain (in this case, weak) forms of control under
international regulations designed to support traditional
telecommunications. The targets of most ITR amendments are the
interconnection arrangements among ISPs. Because it comes from the ITU,
this effort is driven in large part by the interests of foreign
telecommunication incumbents and by developing country administrations
who feel bypassed or marginalized by the burgeoning Internet economy at
layer 4 and above. In that respect, it is somewhat reactionary and
threatening.
But it would be wrong, and a bit silly, to talk about the ITU “taking over” the Internet. It is, rather, the Internet that is taking over the world of telecommunications,
setting more and more of the terms and conditions under which the ITU
and its operating entities function. The Internet-based services’
growth in revenue has far outstripped that of the telecommunication
operators. A fabulous new economy has emerged on top of the
telecommunications platform.
The issue is primarily the economics of interconnection; i.e., the
revenue sharing (or lack thereof) involved in taking and sending
traffic. It is not in the slightest about taking over the IETF, ICANN
or IP address registration. WCIT is also a clash between a
transnational regime based largely on privately negotiated contracts
and the permissionless service provision created by a globally
interoperable, distance-insensitive Internet protocol, and the
nation-state system of hierarchical regulation and bordered gatekeeping
which was built up around telephone companies. The most important
battleground in the WCIT is not censorship or security, but
interconnection and the flows of funds among carriers attendant upon
interconnection agreements. If you want national regulatory authorities
to have more collective control over ISPs generally, and American ISPs
and Internet services specifically, you should support the WCIT effort.
The ITU and its members are, as usual, in reaction mode, a step
behind. The current ITRs were defined in 1988, before the public
internet as we know it even existed. They have numerous archaic
references. They still talk about telex, for example. If you think
there should be ITRs at all, it is absurd not to update them. But that
raises an interesting question that no one else seems to be asking:
should there be ITRs at all? Why do we need them?
The existence of treaty-based telecommunication regulations
administered by an intergovernmental organization made sense in a world
where telecommunications were provided by state-owned monopolies.
Negotiating telecommunication interconnection across national
authorities was very much like negotiating a mutual passport/visa
recognition agreement. Also, many governments had their own
incompatible technical standards and a single, national
telecommunication standards body as well, so having an
intergovernmental organization around to negotiate international
compatibility made sense.
The world of the Internet is very different. It is a world of
liberalized trade in services, of transnational services and
corporation, of dozens if not hundreds of private-sector voluntary
technical standards forums, a world of multiple, competing private
network operating entities, most of them no longer state-owned, and
millions of Internet-based services riding on and crossing over those
multiple platforms. So why are we treating governance of this sector as
something that should be happening through treaty negotiations among
governments?
Why do we need a special set of international telecom regulations at
all? Every country has its own national regulations regarding
interconnection, privacy, antitrust, consumer protection, and so on;
compatibility across platforms and services is much easier technically
than it was in 1930 and tends to get worked out in the market.
International telecommunications is a form of trade in services, and
the WTO agreements already provide a sufficient regulatory basis for
foreign or multinational providers to enter national markets with
different regulatory regimes, and to offer transnational services.
Another missing fact from the debate is exactly how weak the ITRs
and the ITU are. If you don’t follow a duly passed FCC regulation, you
can get fined or you can get your license pulled and put out of
business. The ITU doesn’t have any police. The ITRs are just a bunch of
verbal commitments from “member states” that they will agree to do
something. If the member state doesn’t agree, or chooses not to enforce
what it agreed to, the words are meaningless.
I hope this re-framing of the WCIT helps observers to understand
better what the general context is. In the next post, we look at the
specific language of proposed ITR revisions and explain the degree to
which they do or do not create a threat to Internet freedom.
					
					
			

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