[kictanet] kictanet Digest, Vol 8, Issue 43
Robert Alai
alai.robert at gmail.com
Wed Jan 23 09:40:18 EAT 2008
Wanachi
The domain safaricom.com seems not to open. Why have they ignored the
country level domain?
Alai
On 1/23/08, kictanet-request at lists.kictanet.or.ke <
kictanet-request at lists.kictanet.or.ke> wrote:
>
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> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. about Google &Safaricom:-xyz at safaricom.com (John Walubengo)
> 2. Re: about Google &Safaricom:-xyz at safaricom.co
> (Odhiambo Washington)
> 3. I.T. Case Studies... (Michael Kipsang Bullut)
> 4. [Fwd: [AfrICANN-discuss] AFTLD 2nd African ccTLDs Event, Cape
> Town, SA "April 2008" - Africann invited] (alice)
> 5. Re: about Google &Safaricom:-xyz at safaricom.co (Kai Wulff)
> 6. [Fwd: [AfrICANN-discuss] ICANN Seeks Expressions of Interest
> from Auction Design Experts] (alice)
> 7. [Fwd: Pambazuka News 338: Heart of darkness in Western Media]
> (alice)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2008 06:17:31 -0800 (PST)
> From: John Walubengo <jwalu at yahoo.com>
> Subject: [kictanet] about Google &Safaricom:-xyz at safaricom.com
> To: KICTAnet KICTAnet <kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke>
> Cc: KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions <kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke>
> Message-ID: <930487.5171.qm at web56608.mail.re3.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
>
> I came accross the joint effort to b/w google & safaricom
> with regard to providing e-addresses. Good idea, but my
> question was:
>
> Is the domain 'safaricom.com' locally hosted? I would have
> been happier (technically and mentally) if the suffix was
> xyz at safaricom.CO.KE or is it that suddenly the .KE suffix
> has brought us too much shame and pain that no one wants to
> use it :-(?
>
> walu.
> nb: as a way of leading by example, I have been planning to
> shed off my jwalu at yahoo.com in favor of jwalu at jambo.co.ke
> but I seem to be trapped in some perpetual migration
> fever...Methinks we need to build .KE, both literally and
> electronically.
>
>
>
>
> ____________________________________________________________________________________
> Looking for last minute shopping deals?
> Find them fast with Yahoo! Search.
> http://tools.search.yahoo.com/newsearch/category.php?category=shopping
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2008 17:55:48 +0300
> From: "Odhiambo Washington" <odhiambo at gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [kictanet] about Google &Safaricom:-xyz at safaricom.co
> To: "John Walubengo" <jwalu at yahoo.com>
> Cc: KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions <kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke>
> Message-ID:
> <991123400801220655w6acac9d1ta4f6b8929788b550 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> On Jan 22, 2008 5:17 PM, John Walubengo <jwalu at yahoo.com> wrote:
> > I came accross the joint effort to b/w google & safaricom
> > with regard to providing e-addresses. Good idea, but my
> > question was:
> >
> > Is the domain 'safaricom.com' locally hosted? I would have
> > been happier (technically and mentally) if the suffix was
> > xyz at safaricom.CO.KE or is it that suddenly the .KE suffix
> > has brought us too much shame and pain that no one wants to
> > use it :-(?
>
> Hi Walu,
>
> safaricom.CO.KE is used by safaricom for their staff addresses. It's
> simply not possible to include the ordinary mwananchi like you into
> that! :-)
>
> > walu.
> > nb: as a way of leading by example, I have been planning to
> > shed off my jwalu at yahoo.com in favor of jwalu at jambo.co.ke
> > but I seem to be trapped in some perpetual migration
> > fever...Methinks we need to build .KE, both literally and
> > electronically.
>
> jambo.co.ke - is that Free?
>
> Anyway, walu.co.ke will make more sense to me than anything else.
>
> PS: As an aside, and at the risk of a flame war, are you personally
> happy with Safaricom as a provider?
>
> --
> Best regards,
> Odhiambo WASHINGTON,
> Nairobi,KE
> +254733744121/+254722743223
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>
> "Oh My God! They killed init! You Bastards!"
> --from a /. post
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2008 18:02:12 +0300
> From: "Michael Kipsang Bullut" <kipsangb at gmail.com>
> Subject: [kictanet] I.T. Case Studies...
> To: "KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions" <kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke>
> Cc: KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions <kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke>
> Message-ID:
> <2e9a33da0801220702m57c720b7q24f97d45557f807b at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Greetings,
>
> Does anyone by any chance have any documented I.T. Case Studies with them?
> If you do, could you please forward them to this address:
> kipsangb at iconnect.co.ke Thank you...
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Michael.
>
> --
>
> "To see a world in a grain of sand, and a heaven in a wildflower...hold
> infinity in the palm of your hand, and eternity in an hour..."
>
> ~ William Blakeg.
>
> --
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> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2008 18:58:45 +0300
> From: alice <alice at apc.org>
> Subject: [kictanet] [Fwd: [AfrICANN-discuss] AFTLD 2nd African ccTLDs
> Event, Cape Town, SA "April 2008" - Africann invited]
> To: Kenya ICT Action Network - KICTANet
> <kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke>
> Cc: KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions <kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke>
> Message-ID: <479612B5.8020607 at apc.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
>
> Dear all
>
> FYI and follow up.
>
> best
> alice
>
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: [AfrICANN-discuss] AFTLD 2nd African ccTLDs Event, Cape
> Town,
> SA "April 2008" - Africann invited
> Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2008 16:52:45 +0300
> From: Mohamed EL Bashir <admin at isoc.sd>
> Reply-To: admin at isoc.sd, africann at afrinic.net
> Organization: Sudan Internet Society "SIS"
> To: africann at afrinic.net
>
>
>
> Dear African
>
> AfTLD in cooperation with South Africa's Department of Communications
> ?DOC?, AfTLD
> is organizing the Second African ccTLD event ( Workshops, Training and
> AfTLD General
> Assembly meeting in Cape Town, South Africa from7th to 11th of April
> 2008.
>
> AFTLD workshops main objective is to offer advanced DNS training and
> exchange of
> best practices between African Country Code Top Level Domain
> operators/managers.
>
> Telecom, ISPs and Governments ICT Agencies, are invited to participate in
> AfTLD
> events inorder to be contribute to the process of developing and enhancing
> a national
> Internet infrastructure and provide assistance in building a strong local
> Internet
> services by promoting and utilizing country?s top level domain .
>
> Event Programme :
> The event programme and logistics will be announced soon.
>
> Previous AfTLD Events :
> Visit AfTLD 2007 Cairo Page ( materials, AGM Report, Photo Gallery, ..ect
> ) ..
> http://www.aftld.org/cairo2007/index.html
>
> Best Regards,
> Mohamed El Bashir
> VP Communications & Out-Reach
> AFTLD
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> AfrICANN mailing list
> AfrICANN at afrinic.net
> https://lists.afrinic.net/mailman/listinfo.cgi/africann
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 5
> Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2008 19:59:56 +0300
> From: "Kai Wulff" <kai.wulff at kdn.co.ke>
> Subject: Re: [kictanet] about Google &Safaricom:-xyz at safaricom.co
> To: "Odhiambo Washington" <odhiambo at gmail.com>
> Cc: KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions <kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke>
> Message-ID: <0c2401c85d18$37e08b40$360da8c0 at local.kdn.co.ke>
> Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1";
> reply-type=original
>
> Why not register @butterfly.co.ke .... It's available for free ...
>
> Kai
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Odhiambo Washington" <odhiambo at gmail.com>
> To: <kai.wulff at kdn.co.ke>
> Cc: "KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions" <kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke>
> Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 17:55
> Subject: Re: [kictanet] about Google &Safaricom:-xyz at safaricom.co
>
>
> > On Jan 22, 2008 5:17 PM, John Walubengo <jwalu at yahoo.com> wrote:
> >> I came accross the joint effort to b/w google & safaricom
> >> with regard to providing e-addresses. Good idea, but my
> >> question was:
> >>
> >> Is the domain 'safaricom.com' locally hosted? I would have
> >> been happier (technically and mentally) if the suffix was
> >> xyz at safaricom.CO.KE or is it that suddenly the .KE suffix
> >> has brought us too much shame and pain that no one wants to
> >> use it :-(?
> >
> > Hi Walu,
> >
> > safaricom.CO.KE is used by safaricom for their staff addresses. It's
> > simply not possible to include the ordinary mwananchi like you into
> > that! :-)
> >
> >> walu.
> >> nb: as a way of leading by example, I have been planning to
> >> shed off my jwalu at yahoo.com in favor of jwalu at jambo.co.ke
> >> but I seem to be trapped in some perpetual migration
> >> fever...Methinks we need to build .KE, both literally and
> >> electronically.
> >
> > jambo.co.ke - is that Free?
> >
> > Anyway, walu.co.ke will make more sense to me than anything else.
> >
> > PS: As an aside, and at the risk of a flame war, are you personally
> > happy with Safaricom as a provider?
> >
> > --
> > Best regards,
> > Odhiambo WASHINGTON,
> > Nairobi,KE
> > +254733744121/+254722743223
> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> >
> > "Oh My God! They killed init! You Bastards!"
> > --from a /. post
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > kictanet mailing list
> > kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke
> > http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet
> >
> > This message was sent to: kai.wulff at kdn.co.ke
> > Unsubscribe or change your options at
> >
> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/kai.wulff%40kdn.co.ke
> >
> > --
> > This message has been scanned for viruses and
> > dangerous content by MailScanner, and is
> > believed to be clean.
> >
> >
>
>
> --
> This message has been scanned for viruses and
> dangerous content by MailScanner, and is
> believed to be clean.
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 6
> Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2008 20:50:56 +0300
> From: alice <alice at apc.org>
> Subject: [kictanet] [Fwd: [AfrICANN-discuss] ICANN Seeks Expressions
> of Interest from Auction Design Experts]
> To: Kenya ICT Action Network - KICTANet
> <kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke>
> Cc: KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions <kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke>
> Message-ID: <47962D00.6070305 at apc.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> --------------------
>
> From ICANN
>
> Dear All,
>
> Thanks for your help in disseminating the word for African Companies.
>
> ICANN Seeks Expressions of Interest from Auction Design Experts
>
> 18 January 2008
>
> ICANN is seeking expressions of interest from entities experienced in
> developing and managing auction processes. ICANN has identified several
> areas where auctions might be an appropriate tool, such as the efficient
> disposition of data from terminated registrars and registries, the
> allocation of single-character second-level domain names, and perhaps,
> resolution of contention between competing commercial applicants for
> identical strings in the application process for new generic Top Level
> Domains.
>
> A number of commenters and academics have recommended auctions as the
> preferred method of objectively allocating scarce resources such as
> popular second-level domain names or gTLD strings. Also, ICANN received
> substantial public comment in the discussion on allocation of
> single-character second-level names that the names should be allocated
> through an auction model.
>
> ICANN is an internationally organized non-profit public benefit
> organization that administers certain features of the Internet's unique
> identifiers. As a private-public partnership, ICANN is dedicated to
> preserving the operational stability of the Internet; to promoting
> competition; to achieving broad representation of global Internet
> communities; and to developing policy appropriate to its mission through
> bottom-up, consensus-based processes. A general description of ICANN is
> available at http://icann.org/tr/english.html
> <http://www.icann.org/tr/english.html>.
>
> *Background*
>
> As recommended by the GNSO Council, ICANN commenced a Forum on
> Allocation Methods for Single-Letter and Single-Digit Domain Names in
> gTLD registries. ICANN conducted the public forum from 16 October to 15
> December 2007.
>
> The Forum on Allocation Methods identified support from members of the
> ICANN community and described several auction models of single-letter
> and single-digit domain names at the second-level (see 16 October 2007
> announcement at
> http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-16oct07.htm, and Summary
> of Comments located at
>
> http://www.icann.org/public_comment/single-letter-summary-comments-23dec07.pdf
> [PDF, 61K]. If these models are pursued, ICANN staff has determined that
> the additional knowledge and expertise on auctions is necessary to
> further work in this area.
>
> Although implementation plans are still in development, ICANN staff has
> also identified auctions as a possibility of final resort for addressing
> string contention among multiple applicants for popular new generic
> TLDs. Additional guidance on auctions will be beneficial as staff moves
> toward the introduction of new gTLDs in the near future.
>
> In furtherance of the protection of registrants, auctions also provide a
> mechanism for addressing the termination or failure of accredited
> registrars and gTLD registries and the efficient transfer of names to a
> competent, on-going registrar or registry.
>
> *Qualifications*
>
> Entities interested in submitting Expressions of Interest should be
> experienced in areas of auction design, management and implementation.
> Prior experience with telecommunications, Internet or domain name,
> energy/utility or other asset auctions would be particularly relevant.
>
> *Expressions of Interest*
>
> Expressions of interest should be sent to Patrick Jones, at
> patrick.jones at icann.org <mailto:patrick.jones at icann.org> by 23:59 UTC on
> 18 February 2008. ICANN is hoping to select a qualified entity or
> entities to assist with auctions in 2008.
>
> Accordingly, ICANN is eager to commence a dialogue to determine whether
> your service is interested and would be capable of assisting ICANN with
> the development and management of auction processes. ICANN requests
> Expressions of Interest from potential entities that include information
> showing that your organization can fulfill the requirements set forth
> above, as well as background information about your organization,
> appropriate experience and additional qualifications you believe would
> be relevant, but that are not addressed above.
>
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> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 7
> Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2008 08:45:55 +0300
> From: alice <alice at apc.org>
> Subject: [kictanet] [Fwd: Pambazuka News 338: Heart of darkness in
> Western Media]
> To: Kenya ICT Action Network - KICTANet
> <kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke>
> Cc: KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions <kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke>
> Message-ID: <4796D493.4090608 at apc.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=WINDOWS-1252; format=flowed
>
> western media bias...Africa
>
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: Pambazuka News 338: Heart of darkness in Western Media
> Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2008 22:26:13 +0000
> From: Firoze Manji <fmanji at mac.com>
> To: pambazuka-news at pambazuka.gn.apc.org
>
>
>
> PAMBAZUKA NEWS 338: HEART OF DARKNESS IN WESTERN MEDIA
>
> The authoritative electronic weekly newsletter and platform for
> social justice in Africa
>
> Pambazuka News (English edition): ISSN 1753-6839
>
> With nearly 500 contributors and an estimated 500,000 readers
> Pambazuka News is the authoritative pan African electronic weekly
> newsletter and platform for social justice in Africa providing
> cutting edge commentary and in-depth analysis on politics and current
> affairs, development, human rights, refugees, gender issues and
> culture in Africa.
>
> To view online, go to http://www.pambazuka.org/
> To SUBSCRIBE or UNSUBSCRIBE ? please visit, http://www.pambazuka.org/
> en/subscribe.php
>
> CONTENTS: 1. Features, 2. Comment and analysis, 3. Pan-African Postcard
>
> Please note that views expressed in articlea published in Pambazuka
> News reflect those of the authors and do not necessarily represent
> those of Pambazuka News or the publishers, Fahamu.
>
> Support the struggle for social justice in Africa. Give generously!
>
> Donate at: http://www.pambazuka.org/en/donate.php
>
>
> /\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\
> Highlights from this issue
>
> FEATURE:
> - John Barbieri on media coverage of the Kenya crisis
> - Pambazuka editors on the word ?tribe?
> COMMENT & ANALYSIS:
> - Emma Mawdsley on British coverage of China in Africa
> - John Lonsdale on ethnicity, tribe and state in Kenya
> - Antony Ong'ayo on the Kenya case and media bias
> PAN-AFRICAN POSTCARD: George Ogola on parachute journalism and the
> Kenyan crisis
>
>
> /\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\
> 1 Features
> WHAT IS IN THE WORD TRIBE?
> Africa Focus, Africa Action and H-Net Africa contributors on Western
> media coverage of Africa
> Pambazuka editors
>
> Pambazuka editors give you the war on the word "tribe"
>
> What?s in a word? What does the word ?tribe? carry? Here below
> Pambazuka Editor?s give you a few snippets of what is a long struggle
> to get US Mainstream media to stop using a racist and stereotypical
> lens in its coverage of Africa. You can find the fascinating
> discussion at www. http://www.h-net.org/~africa We end with an
> excerpt from an Africa Action essay on the word tribe. You can see
> the full essay at: http://www.africaaction.org/bp/ethall.htm
>
> Africa Focus (http://www.africafocus.org/docs08/ethn0801.php)
> narrates that Jeffrey Gettleman for the New York Times in his
> December 31 dispatch from Nairobi [wrote that the Kenya electoral
> crisis], "seems to have tapped into an atavistic vein of tribal
> tension that always lay beneath the surface in Kenya but until now
> had not provoked widespread mayhem." Gettleman was not exceptional
> among those covering the post-election violence in his stress on
> "tribe." But his terminology was unusually explicit in revealing the
> assumption that such divisions are rooted in unchanging and
> presumably primitive identities.
>
> However Africa Focus gives an update that since the Africa Focus
> Bulletin that covered Gettleman?s use of language: ?Gettleman's
> coverage of Kenya in the New York Times has avoided the
> indiscriminate use of the word tribe in favor of "ethnic group," and
> has noted the historical origins and political character of the
> continued violence in the country, as well as its links to ethnic
> divisions?.
>
> But Peter Alegi from Michigan State University in an H- Net Africa
> posting says and then asks: ?While Gettleman (Times' EastAfrica
> bureau chief) seems to have toned down his use of "tribe" thanks to
> our protests, but isn't substituting "ethnic group" for it a minor
> victory?
>
> Also, folks might be interested in this side story: the other day, I
> wrote a brief message to Bill Keller, Times' Executive Editor (ex NYT
> correspondent from Johannesburg [1992-1995]), alerting him to the H-
> Africa thread on his paper's handling of the Kenya crisis.
>
> Mr. Keller's insulting response included the following statement:
>
> "I get it. Anyone who uses the word "tribe" is a racist. [. . .] It's
> a tediously familiar mantra in the Western community of Africa
> scholars. In my experience, most Africans who live outside the
> comforts of academia (and who use the word "tribe" with shameless
> disregard for the political sensitivities of American academics) have
> more important concerns."
>
> So Gettleman's ignorance about African languages, history, and
> cultural identities doesn't seem to trouble his boss one bit. And the
> utter disregard Keller seems to have for what scholars is reinforced
> in a closing line dripping with condescension:
>
> "If you have a string that has something insightful to say about
> Kenya, I hope you'll pass it along."
>
> Kudos to AfricaFocus then, but it seems that the struggle for
> accuracy and informed analysis of Africa in US mainstream media is
> going to be a long and tortuous one.
>
> Carol Sicherman, a Professor Emerita. at Lehman College underlines
> Alegi?s point with the following post to H-net Africa: She says
> writes that ?On January 12, I wrote to the Public Editor of the New
> York Times as follows (I did not get an answer):
>
> Reading recent dispatches from Kenya, I was pleased to notice that
> the Times has responded to years of complaints about the biased terms
> "tribe" and "tribal," replacing them with "ethnic group" and
> "ethnic." This editorial policy, however, seems to be confined to the
> news. Roberta Smith's article "Face Time: Masks, Animal to Video" in
> the Arts Section on Jan. 11 uses the egregiously offensive phrase "a
> tribal, almost animalistic ritual." It is exactly that equation that
> makes it necessary to remove "tribe" and its related words. In the
> case in question, removing "tribal" would have put the focus on
> "animalistic" without designating Africans as inherently animalistic.
> It is particularly odd to find such a clich? in a discussion of the
> work of Yinka Shonibare, a highly sophisticated, learned, and ironic
> artist.
>
> I don't know how copy editors are instructed at the Times, but the
> policy adopted for the news section needs to be adopted for all
> sections.
>
> And last but not least, in1997 Africa Action said the following of
> the word tribe: Tribe has no coherent meaning.
>
> What is a tribe? The Zulu in South Africa, whose name and common
> identity was forged by the creation of a powerful state less than two
> centuries ago, and who are a bigger group than French Canadians, are
> called a tribe. So are the !Kung hunter-gatherers of Botswana and
> Namibia, who number in the hundreds. The term is applied to Kenya's
> Maasai herders and Kikuyu farmers, and to members of these groups in
> cities and towns when they go there to live and work. Tribe is used
> for millions of Yoruba in Nigeria and Benin, who share a language but
> have an eight-hundred year history of multiple and sometimes warring
> city-states, and of religious diversity even within the same extended
> families. Tribe is used for Hutu and Tutsi in the central African
> countries of Rwanda and Burundi. Yet the two societies (and regions
> within them) have different histories. And in each one, Hutu and
> Tutsi lived interspersed in the same territory. They spoke the same
> language, married each other, and shared virtually all aspects of
> culture. At no point in history could the distinction be defined by
> distinct territories, one of the key assumptions built into "tribe."
>
> Tribe is used for groups who trace their heritage to great kingdoms.
> It is applied to Nigeria's Igbo and other peoples who organized
> orderly societies composed of hundreds of local communities and
> highly developed trade networks without recourse to elaborate states.
> Tribe is also used for all sorts of smaller units of such larger
> nations, peoples or ethnic groups. The followers of a particular
> local leader may be called a tribe. Members of an extended kin-group
> may be called a tribe. People who live in a particular area may be
> called a tribe. We find tribes within tribes, and cutting across
> other tribes. Offering no useful distinctions, tribe obscures many.
> As a description of a group, tribe means almost anything, so it
> really means nothing.
>
> If by tribe we mean a social group that shares a single territory, a
> single language, a single political unit, a shared religious
> tradition, a similar economic system, and common cultural practices,
> such a group is rarely found in the real world. These characteristics
> almost never correspond precisely with each other today, nor did they
> at any time in the past.
>
> Tribe promotes a myth of primitive African timelessness, obscuring
> history and change.
>
> The general sense of tribe as most people understand it is associated
> with primitiveness. To be in a tribal state is to live in a
> uncomplicated, traditional condition. It is assumed there is little
> change. Most African countries are economically poor and often
> described as less developed or underdeveloped. Westerners often
> conclude that they have not changed much over the centuries, and that
> African poverty mainly reflects cultural and social conservatism.
> Interpreting present day Africa through the lens of tribes reinforces
> the image of timelessness. Yet the truth is that Africa has as much
> history as anywhere else in the world. It has undergone momentous
> changes time and again, especially in the twentieth century. While
> African poverty is partly a product of internal dynamics of African
> societies, it has also been caused by the histories of external slave
> trades and colonial rule.
>
> In the modern West, tribe often implies primitive savagery.
>
> When the general image of tribal timelessness is applied to
> situations of social conflict between Africans, a particularly
> destructive myth is created. Stereotypes of primitiveness and
> conservative backwardness are also linked to images of irrationality
> and superstition. The combination leads to portrayal of violence and
> conflict in Africa as primordial, irrational and unchanging. This
> image resonates with traditional Western racialist ideas and can
> suggest that irrational violence is inherent and natural to Africans.
> Yet violence anywhere has both rational and irrational components.
> Just as particular conflicts have reasons and causes elsewhere, they
> also have them in Africa. The idea of timeless tribal violence is not
> an explanation. Instead it disguises ignorance of real causes by
> filling the vacuum of real knowledge with a popular stereotype.
>
> Images of timelessness and savagery hide the modern character of
> African ethnicity, including ethnic conflict.
>
> The idea of tribe particularly shapes Western views of ethnicity and
> ethnic conflict in Africa, which has been highly visible in recent
> years. Over and over again, conflicts are interpreted as "ancient
> tribal rivalries," atavistic eruptions of irrational violence which
> have always characterized Africa. In fact they are nothing of the
> sort. The vast majority of such conflicts could not have happened a
> century ago in the ways that they do now. Pick almost any place where
> ethnic conflict occurs in modern Africa. Investigate carefully the
> issues over which it occurs, the forms it takes, and the means by
> which it is organized and carried out. Recent economic developments
> and political rivalries will loom much larger than allegedly ancient
> and traditional hostilities.
>
> Ironically, some African ethnic identities and divisions now
> portrayed as ancient and unchanging actually were created in the
> colonial period. In other cases earlier distinctions took new, more
> rigid and conflictual forms over the last century. The changes came
> out of communities' interactions within a colonial or post-colonial
> context, as well as movement of people to cities to work and live.
> The identities thus created resemble modern ethnicities in other
> countries, which are also shaped by cities, markets and national states.
>
> Tribe substitutes a generalized illusion for detailed analysis of
> particular situations.
>
> The bottom-line problem with the idea of tribe is that it is
> intellectually lazy. It substitutes the illusion of understanding for
> analysis of particular circumstances. Africa is far away from North
> America. Accurate information about particular African states and
> societies takes more work to find than some other sorts of
> information. Yet both of those situations are changing rapidly.
> Africa is increasingly tied into the global economy and international
> politics. Using the idea of tribe instead of real, specific
> information and analysis of African events has never served the truth
> well. It also serves the public interest badly.
>
> *Please send comments to editor at pambazuka.org or comment online at
> http://www.pambazuka.org
> ******
>
> THE POVERTY OF INTERNATIONAL JOURNALISM
> John Barbieri
>
> John Barbieri writes about the pervasive and dangerous myths that
> have characterized the coverage of Kenya's post election crisis in
> the US and elsewhere
>
> First, let me honorably mention that the title of this piece is
> borrowed from Kenyan journalist Rebecca Wanjiku [1]. As most others,
> I have watched in dismay and outrage at the events in Kenya following
> the announcement on Dec. 30th of the (manipulated) election results.
> I have been equally, if not more so, dismayed, outraged and disgusted
> by how the situation and violence there has been depicted and framed
> in the international media, especially here in the United States. In
> almost all of the recent coverage and commentary on Kenya in the
> mainstream U.S. media there have been three particularly dangerous
> and pervasive myths and misrepresentations that have appeared. All of
> these myths have been previously commented on by much more eminent
> figures than I, but perhaps it will help to restate and further
> comment on all of them in one place.
>
> Three Pervasive Myths and Misrepresentations
>
> First, this is not ?ethnic conflict.? Similar to the way that most
> African conflicts get reported, there is the ubiquitous framing of
> the situation as conflict solely being driven by ethnicity. This is
> most profoundly seen in the statements of ?tribal conflict?; it must
> be made clear that this is an extremely racist, antiquated and
> inaccurate depiction of the situation. Though there has been an
> ethnic factor to some of the conflict, this factor is largely
> overemphasized at expense of the more pervasive factor of the rich/
> poor and the gross inequities in resource distribution across and
> among ?ethnic lines? (that is as if such lines could be so clearly
> drawn). As many have more articulately said elsewhere the situation
> must be re-framed as a political conflict.
>
> More specifically, the organized violence following the elections
> must be framed as political elites manipulating their supporters
> (including paying and equipping armed militias and using the armed
> instruments of the State) to inflict violence on their behalf; it is
> so-called leaders fomenting hatred among their supporters all for
> their own personal benefit; and it is power-hungry politicians
> willing to do whatever it takes, literally willing to throw Kenyans?
> lives away in their attempt to do it, and to be so disgustingly eager
> to use that violence as a mere pressure point on the national and
> international community to get/retain power. Both parties were guilty
> of this, but in particular the man sworn in as President has employed
> the disproportionate brutal force of the police and military,
> especially the General Service Unit.
>
> The repercussions of depicting the situation as solely ethnically-
> driven can be seen in the distorted sense of history and context for
> all conflicts in Africa and elsewhere. One of the most pervasive
> historical misconstructions is especially evident in the popular
> writings and collective memory of the Rwandan genocide, which
> continue to frame the genocide as being simply the result of
> primordial ?tribal conflict.? In so doing the context and history of
> the genocide is obfuscated by neglecting the ongoing role played by
> the brutal legacy of the colonial power (Belgium in the case of
> Rwanda) and of national, regional and international politics
> following ?independence.?
>
> Second, this is not a ?shock.? We need to attack the myths and claims
> being reported that the developments in Kenya are a great ?shock,?
> and that this is a great blow to a ?beacon of stability, democracy
> and economic growth in Africa.? For anyone who knows the history of
> Kenya, the history of colonialism and the history since
> ?independence,? they know that these developments are not a shock and
> that they have been long in the making. The developments are directly
> connected to the inability of the Kenyan government to come to terms
> with the brutal legacy and power distributions inherited from British
> rule, including the constitution itself. And specifically the
> developments were written all over the wall leading up to the
> election to anyone who was paying attention to the fomenting of
> ethnic tension by Kibaki/PNU and Odinga/ODM, yet too few seemed
> willing to acknowledge it. Anyone who claims that this is a ?shock?
> is either blatantly ignorant, dishonest or practices mere wishful
> thinking to be so na?ve. And anyone who claims that Kenya is a grand
> ?beacon of stability, democracy and economic growth in Africa?
> misrepresents the hardships and injustices that the vast majority of
> Kenyans desperately face on a daily basis; they also inaccurately
> depict the past five years of the ?booming economic growth? witnessed
> under the Kibaki regime, which through exorbitant amounts of
> corruption and increasing income inequality has ensured that the
> benefits from that robust economic growth has by-and-large reached
> only the very elite.
>
> Third, and perhaps most importantly, is the role of the U.S. It must
> be made clear and people must fully understand the large role that
> the U.S. has been playing in Kenya and throughout eastern Africa. The
> U.S. has keenly been trying to build up allies in East Africa and the
> Horn of Africa to counterbalance other perceived ?threat? countries
> in the region. These key U.S. allies include Kenya, Tanzania,
> Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda and the Transitional Federal Government of
> Somalia. These allies are meant to act as a counter-balance to the
> ?threats? of Sudan (the Bashir regime), Eritrea and the Union of
> Islamic Courts (UIC) in Somalia. The Bush administration has clearly
> supported incumbent Kibaki due to the fact that his government has
> been one of these key allies in the ?war on terror? in the East and
> the Horn of Africa. The Kibaki administration has allowed and worked
> closely with the U.S. on supposed ?terrorist? raids along the coast
> of Kenya. The Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Unit (with American and British
> support) has conducted these extralegal anti-terrorism operations
> along the Kenyan coast, targeting the sizeable Muslim population
> there. According to human rights organizations in Kenya these anti-
> terrorism operations have included the roundup, torture and
> extradition of Muslims (to Somalia, Ethiopia and elsewhere) without
> being charged or given a trial, similar to ?war on terror? operations
> elsewhere. The people, nearly all of whom are Muslims, being targeted
> are dubiously claimed to be Al Qaeda operatives or a part of other
> subversive terrorist organizations.
>
> Similarly, Kenya was an ally during the U.S.-supported invasion of
> Somalia by Ethiopian forces to overthrow the Union of Islamic Courts
> (UIC) in southern Somalia exactly one year ago. What was, and still
> is, routinely missed in the story of the UIC is how they helped to
> implement order, stability and social services that had not been seen
> in southern Somalia for nearly 15 years; and how the UIC was
> primarily an effort to depose corrupt warlords (many of whom were
> being backed by the U.S.), not to impose an international Al Qaeda-
> like jihadist movement as many claim(ed). Kenya?s (i.e., the Kibaki
> administration?s) role in the military operations included working
> with U.S. forces along the Kenya-Somalia border and the ubiquitous
> sharing of ?intelligence,? but they also played a more direct role as
> well. At the onset of the invasion, the Kenyan military, seemingly at
> the behest of the U.S., closed off its border with Somalia and
> refused entry to all Somalis, including refugees, trying to flee
> southern Somalia. Soon after, the U.S. conducted air strikes in
> southern Somalia killing at least 30 people, most, if not all, of
> whom were probably fleeing civilians, not ?Al Qaeda operatives? as
> was alleged. In short, the Bush administration had clear ?national
> security? ambitions in seeking that Kibaki, as a key ?war on terror?
> ally in eastern Africa, stay in power. Also, add to this the vested
> American, UK and other European business interests in Kenya as well,
> who likely did not care for Odinga?s ?social democratic? platform
> which was posing the threat of more taxes and redistributive wealth.
>
> The biggest blow to U.S. credibility and neutrality in the matter,
> though, came immediately after the election results were announced.
> Incredulously, the U.S. State Department quickly came out and
> congratulated the man sworn in as President on his ?victory.? This
> was done despite the fact that every diplomat in the country clearly
> knew of the irregularities in the election and the hastily swearing
> in process of the President. Realizing its mistake the State
> Department quickly moved to retract this congratulatory statement,
> and then issued a statement calling an end to the violence and for
> the situation to be resolved through ?constitutional and legal
> remedies.? However, it is quite clear that these ?remedies? are
> blatantly weighted in the incumbent?s favor and thus will merely
> support the status quo: Kibaki and corruption. Since January 4th the
> U.S. has been pursuing the diplomacy route with Assistant Secretary
> of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer, who has now departed,
> and Ambassador Michael Ranneberger leading these attempts. However,
> it is was disturbing that despite Frazer?s close watch and ongoing
> separate talks with both sides, she (and therefore the U.S. in
> general) was not able to prevent Kibaki from disastrously going ahead
> and filling the most critical posts in the President?s cabinet.
>
> More recently it should be no surprise that the few Heads of State
> who have come out and congratulated Kibaki on his ?victory? are also
> key ?war on terror? allies of the Bush administration. These Heads of
> State include: President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda (who has received
> much aid from the Bush administration and has been crucial in
> supplying troops for the AU force in Somalia), transitional President
> Abdullahi Yusuf of Somalia (who the U.S., Ethiopia and Kenya helped
> reinstate after the overthrow of the UIC), Sheikh Sabah of Kuwait,
> King Mohammed VI of Morocco, and Prime Minister Themba Dlamini of
> Swaziland. An excerpt from Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf?s
> congratulatory message to President Kibaki is worth quoting: ??both
> our countries must remain strong partners on the global war on terror
> and steadfast Allies in protecting freedom.? Further still, Uganda?s
> starch dependence on Kenyan supply routes and Museveni?s close
> relationship with Kibaki must be stressed, and therefore the
> widespread reports that the Uganda People?s Defense Force is
> masquerading as police, destroying property and killing people in
> western Kenya must be seriously addressed!
>
> As others have already made clear (e.g., Mukoma wa Ngugi [2], Wandia
> Njoya [3], etc.), it should not be assumed that Odinga/ODM is somehow
> inherently antithetical to the interests of the U.S. and of
> international capital; the extravagant fuss over Odinga?s Hummer was
> perhaps one highly illustrative example of his true nature as an
> elite who gladly enjoys connections to the West and living well above
> the rest of Kenyans. Also, it should not be believed that U.S.
> support for corrupt and autocratic Kenyan leaders started with Bush-
> Kibaki, it is well-documented how the U.S. had been keenly supporting
> and arming the preceding 24 year dictatorship of Daniel arap Moi
> during the final years of Cold War geopolitics and beyond. Lastly,
> all of this is not meant to suggest a direct U.S. connection to the
> manipulated election results, but still the overall interests and
> role of the U.S., and other international actors, in Kenya must be
> made clear. (For more facts and figures on the U.S.?s military ties
> to Kenya and incumbent Kibaki see Daniel Volman?s excellent short
> article <http://www.concernedafricascholars.org/080110_volman.php> [4].)
>
> The Poverty of International Journalism
>
> In all, it has been disgusting how reporters have been so eager to
> energetically document and provide inaccurate and inhumane commentary
> on the bloodshed, but have been too unconcerned in trying to actually
> understand the situation and report what Kenyans are really saying
> and thinking; although this should certainly come as no surprise. The
> inspiration and title for this article comes from Kenyan journalist
> Rebecca Wanjiku?s blog ?The Poverty of International Journalism,? and
> this excerpt about a broadcast on CNN is worth quoting at length:
>
> Understanding the local language is very important when reporting
> from foreign countries. For instance on Sunday [January 6th 2008],
> there was on television an injured man and those carrying him said in
> Swahili "tunampeleka hospitali" (we are taking him to hospital?) But
> the journalist's translation was that he had been asked "are you shot
> or cut?" with the response coming back that he was actually the
> victim of a shooting. It is unlikely that this was an innocent
> mistake, the journalist may simply not have cared what was true and
> what was not, and it is unlikely either that the world audience would
> have noticed, but using video like this to underline a story you are
> making up is dishonest reporting. I have faith that Kenyans will soon
> be embracing each other, and that we will soon get back to the urgent
> yet more mundane tasks of kujitafutia riziki ? putting food on the
> table. I hope CNN will be around to cover that and not simply rush on
> to the next big story. By the way, how comes CNN does not cover
> American soldiers or civilians bleeding and writhing in pain, yet has
> no second thought for the dignity of the dead and dying from other
> countries?
>
> It has been Kenyan journalists and bloggers, like Rebecca, and other
> local reporters who have been the real champions of correctly
> depicting and analyzing the situation, and who are actually raising
> the real desperate concerns of Kenyans. Rather than condescendingly
> prescribing analysis and treatment from London, New York or even the
> U.S. embassy in Nairobi (which is, although not as geographically
> removed, as cognitively removed from the concerns of Kenyans), the
> mainstream media needs to listen, understand and make clear the
> history and context of the current situation, and stop speaking so
> ignorantly and arrogantly about it.
>
> And good journalists need to call out fellow journalists who are
> perpetuating the pervasive myths and stereotypes (e.g., Canadian
> journalist Arno Kopecky?s Daily Nation article [5]). I would like to
> take this opportunity, then, to call out CNN reporter Zain Verjee.
> Miss Verjee, as someone who grew up in Kenya, and therefore should
> know better, it is despicable how you have been playing up the
> ?ethnic conflict? angle in your TV reporting. Why are you doing this?
> Are you callously using the plight of your countrymen/women to simply
> boost your career ambitions? Why is it that you so seldom let other
> Kenyans actually speak, and rather choose to just speak ?on their
> behalf?? Why is it that as someone who has worked on campaigns to
> spread awareness of violence against women have you not been more
> vigorously reporting the disproportionate effect that the violence
> and displacement has had on women in Kenya? Why is it that I have not
> once heard you mention the role the U.S. is playing in Kenya? Miss
> Verjee I am sorry that you were hit by a teargas canister during your
> recent reporting (although it should not have been a surprise given
> your attempt to ?get the story?), but perhaps you might now feel some
> of the brutality that so many Kenyans have endured and perhaps now
> you may start honestly speaking on their behalf and letting their
> voices be heard.
>
> The situation in Kenya, like all political conflicts (e.g., eastern
> Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Darfur, eastern Chad, Iraq,
> Pakistan, Burma, Sri Lanka, etc.), should be vigorously reported, but
> it must be framed and depicted accurately by incorporating a proper
> historical context and the perspective of the people there. The
> perspectives/stories of people there must be told, but they must not
> be simply trivialized and sensationalized, as is so often done,
> particularly in the simplemindedness of televised ?reporting.? It is
> so sad that in the business that is U.S. TV reporting we seldom
> actually hear the voices of people telling their stories from around
> the world; rather we too often get a voice-over by some clearly
> intelligible Western (i.e., ?white-sounding?) reporter. Why not use
> subtitles!?! Why must these people be robbed from having their voices
> heard, why must we be robbed from hearing them?!? Or why not find
> articulate English speakers (there certainly are an abundance of them
> in Kenya) to speak on their own behalf, and not demean their
> ?foreignness? by using unwarranted subtitles? And why do we have to
> wait for ?crisis? situations to hear these voices? Why do we hear, or
> rather really just see, only the bad? Why do we not hear and see
> good, fun, silly, playful, uplifting and empowering stories being
> told every day? Why do we not hear and see stories with depth about
> love and dreams as often as we superficially see stories about loss
> and despair?
>
> In conclusion, news without a proper sense of history and context is
> just a list of jumbled half-truths, and news without a proper respect
> for and input from the people who are actually affected is just a
> list of callous stereotypes. In the past week, now that the violence
> has slightly eased, the U.S. media seems to be losing interest in the
> situation in Kenya. Forgive the extreme vulgarity, but the mainstream
> U.S. media appears to send the following double message: we are not
> interested in Africans or African politics, that is unless there is a
> full out Rwanda-like bloodbath (with pictures of gruesome machete
> attacks and all, of course) so we can stereotype all Africans as the
> savages we think they are. I hope that all journalists, reporters and
> editors may heed these calls and start acting responsibly and start
> reporting the truth coming ?out of Africa.?
>
> * John Barbieri is an independent reporter who lived in Kenya from
> Jan.-June 2007, and is the founder of the US Coalition for Peace with
> Truth and Justice in Kenya. He can currently be reached at
> kenyanpeace at gmail.com
>
> *Please send comments to editor at pambazuka.org or comment online at
> http://www.pambazuka.org
>
> * Please click on the link for the article notes
> http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/45590
> ******
>
>
>
> /\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\
> 2 Comment and analysis
> FU MANCHU VERSUS DR LIVINGSTONE IN THE DARK CONTINENT?
> How British broadsheet newspapers represent China, Africa and the West
> Emma Mawdsley
>
> Emma Mawdsley examines the coverage of China's growing influence in
> Africa by the British print media
>
> The words and images we use do not describe ?reality?, they create
> it. Language (terms, metaphors, and analogies) and images (such as
> films, news photos, maps and cartoons) are caught up in struggles
> over interpretation ? which means that the language and images of the
> powerful are important tools in creating and maintaining particular
> points of view amongst politicians, policy-makers and the public.
> This paper explores the way in which six British broadsheet
> newspapers have covered China?s growing role in Africa over the past
> seven years. China?s impacts in Africa are complex and varied by
> country, sector and context, and most of the newspaper articles
> reflect that. Whether more critical or approving in tone, the
> articles invariably point to both benefits and problems associated
> with China?s rise. Even those which focus on specific issues or
> countries, tend to open or conclude with at least a sentence or two
> outlining a broader assessment of the prospects and problems
> associated with the growing relationship. Even so, a detailed
> analysis led us to identify five narrative tropes that recurred
> consistently and frequently, which tended to systematically endorse
> images of African weakness, Western trusteeship and Chinese
> ruthlessness:
>
> 1) a tendency to refer to ?the Chinese? or ?China?, as if the various
> Chinese actors all shared the same interests;
> 2) a tendency to focus excessively on China?s interests in oil over
> other commodities;
> 3) a decided preference for focussing on China?s negative impacts on
> the continent, and within that, on issues and places of violence,
> disorder and corruption (e.g. Zimbabwe, Sudan, Angola) over other
> negative issues (e.g. trade imbalances, undermining domestic
> manufacturing sectors);
> 4) a tendency to portray Africans as victims or villains; and
> 5) a frequently complacent account of the role and interest of
> different western actors in Africa. Representations of Africa, China
> and the West First, most press reports tend to refer simply to ?the
> Chinese?, often overlooking the fact that Chinese communities and
> actors in Africa are diverse in origins, roles and interests. The
> Chinese in Africa include longer standing and more recent diasporic
> communities, often engaged in small and medium business, but with a
> range of histories and relations with China and with their adopted
> African homes. Media accounts tend to focus much more strongly on
> Chinese state firms and agencies, as well as the more recent wave of
> large private enterprises (although the distinction can be blurred).
> But interests differ ? longer term Chinese diasporic populations, the
> managers of Chinese companies, Chinese labourers employed by those
> companies, and different elements of the Chinese Government may have
> very different views on, for example, political stability, corporate
> transparency or democratic accountability. Different Chinese firms
> may have competing interests over what constitute desirable
> conditions for import/export trade or commodity extraction/
> manufactures. The following quote indicates competing interests that
> are otherwise rarely reflected in the media accounts that were
> analysed: ?Venturing into Africa is a superficially attractive option
> for Chinese enterprises with limited global experience, as they can
> avoid the kind of competition and rules they face in markets such as
> the US or the European Union. But Chinese companies are also under
> great pressure to invest in Africa to fulfil political commitments
> made by China?s leaders, who provide financial incentives, including
> cheap loans, for them to go overseas. ?First we must listen to what
> the country says, but we have our own company considerations? says Mr
> Wang of Chico, an enterprise controlled by the provincial government
> of Henan ?[Mr Wang says] they ?get criticism? from officials back
> home if they miss business targets, which often involve expanding
> overseas investment? (Financial Times, 20 June 2006: ?China ventures
> on rocky roads to trade with Africa?).
>
> Allied to this is a tendency to isolate Chinese firms as nationally
> discrete entities. In fact, joint enterprises with both African and
> western firms are becoming more common.
>
> The second theme identified is the focus on oil and, to a lesser
> extent, natural gas and ores, over other commodities. This reflects a
> wider focus on the geopolitics of oil, a subject that the Iraq war
> and massive oil price rises have brought to the fore of western
> public attention. Although oil is undeniably an important issue, and
> a major component of Sino-Africa trade and economic growth, this is
> concentrated in Angola, Sudan, Nigeria, Gabon and Guinea. For many
> African countries, exports of fish, timber and grain, or imports of
> relatively cheap manufactured goods are just as important. The focus
> on oil lends itself to a discourse of resource competition rather
> than the recognition that China and the West have a range of
> interests and relations in Africa, including potentially
> complementary ones. Third is a very uneven focus on China's interests
> and impacts in different African nations. More positive elements tend
> to get less attention (debt cancellation, investment, lower commodity
> prices for consumers, support for a greater international voice etc),
> with a preferred focus on problem issues. Moreover, we find that
> there is a preferred focus on zones and subjects of violent conflict,
> corruption, genocide and authoritarian leadership, rather than, say,
> the less gripping images of China?s impacts on trade imbalances or
> under-cutting of African manufacturing sectors. The overwhelming
> balance of articles is on Sudan, Zimbabwe and Angola, with far less
> attention paid to, for example, Lesotho, which is experiencing
> immense hardship competing with China in textile production; or Kenya
> which is struggling to compete with China in the manufactured goods
> sector.
>
> Fourth, within these accounts, Africans, tend to be reduced to
> villains (Mugabe, the Sudanese government) and victims (African
> populations, Darfur, the poor), an observation that fits with the
> findings of many other critical evaluations of the media. African
> agency, as leaders or ordinary citizens, workers and consumers, is
> rarely emphasised. Allusions to adolescence or childhood are common.
> Thus, discussing China?s effects on Chad:
>
> ?Chad was supposed to establish a model of good practice. But, as a
> western observer in the country puts it: ?The risk is [following
> China?s oil deals] it will become an example for the worst [African]
> pupils? [emphasis added]. (Financial Times, 23 January 2006: ?The
> ?resource curse? anew?.)
>
> The paternalistic line that the West needs to save Africa from China?
> depredations is something reflected elsewhere in the media. An
> extended Channel Four news report which was widely circulated and
> repeated, started: ?To Tony Blair, Africa is somewhere which needs
> healing or saving and Sierra Leone gets a lot of British aid. But the
> Chinese are looking at the continent through different eyes. They see
> it as a source of raw materials, especially oil, which they need for
> their own development. And somewhere like Sierra Leone, fresh out of
> war ? they think it?s ripe for trade and investment? (Lindsey
> Hillsum, Channel Four, 4 July 2005)
>
> Finally, Western actors ? businesses, governments, national and
> international development NGOs ? are typically portrayed as benign
> within the majority of these articles and accounts. Many articles
> imply or state that while the West did in the past have supported
> authoritarian leaders, or were party to corrupt business practices,
> it has learnt its lesson and reformed. While colonialism was
> economically exploitative and morally wrong, according to many of the
> articles exploring China?s ?new African safari? or ?new scramble for
> Africa?, western colonialism is claimed to at least have had a
> paternalistic/developmental dimension and well-intentioned elements -
> an attitude that has translated into an ethical concern for Africa in
> the postcolonial period.
>
> Thus, in the contemporary setting, Western companies supposedly
> operate under a different ethical regime because of their own high
> convictions; labour laws; voluntary agreements as part of wider
> government and third sector pressure to improve business with Africa;
> consumer demands for more ethical production and trading; and/or
> shareholder pressure. None of these are said to apply to state-run or
> private Chinese companies. Above all, the dominant (although by no
> means universal, narrative) that runs through many of the articles is
> that the mistakes of the past have been addressed, and the West is
> now the architect and energiser of a new drive towards good
> governance and development, with aid now accompanied by ethical
> conditionalities, while reformed commercial practices promise
> investment, extraction and trade that will enhance development rather
> than line the pockets of kleptocratic elites. These faltering steps
> forward, which will be of mutual benefit to western companies and
> ordinary African people, are under threat from the unscrupulous
> Chinese. A few quotes give a flavour of these arguments: ?But while
> the meeting [2006 FOCAC] is intended to fuel China?s global drive for
> resources, raw materials and markets, concerns are growing that the
> boosters of Beijing do not have Africa?s best interests at heart and
> that western countries will be cut out of future business?. (The
> Guardian, 1 November 2006: ?Beijing?s Race for Africa?)
>
> ?There are concerns too about soft loans leading to unsustainable
> debt and generous aid programmes that undermine efforts to improve
> governance, transparency and accountability. If the World Bank and
> IMF say no or attach conditions, Beijing always says yes?. The [2006]
> Beijing Summit is a big deal for China, a deliberately showy monument
> to its value-free strategy. It would be absurd to claim that western
> greed and interest did not do enormous damage in an earlier scramble
> for Africa. But the age of colonialism is over. It should be accepted
> today that global power brings global responsibilities. Tyranny,
> inequality and corruption offend universal values. In the countries
> where it now has the ability to make a difference, China should think
> twice about offering its help with no strings attached?. (The
> Guardian, 4 November 2006: ?Scrambling to Beijing: China and Africa?)
>
> ?That virtuous circle of increased assistance and better governance
> has been the hall mark of the approach taken, with varying degrees of
> success, by the West and Japan since the end of the Cold War. China
> now threatens to blow apart that consensus?. (The Telegraph, 26 April
> 2006: ?The dragon in Africa?)
>
> ?Soft Chinese loans to vulnerable and corrupt African regimes,
> arranged outside the painstakingly agreed Equator Principles for
> responsible lending, risk reversing progress towards extricating such
> regimes from debt. ? And misconceived or badly executed civil
> engineering projects risk irreversible environmental damage ? Such a
> critique is valid. Coming from the West it also has a hint of the
> hypocritical. China?s current scramble for African energy and
> resources is modest compared with Europe?s scramble for African
> territory a century and a half ago. And China?s sometimes reckless
> spending only mirrors gambles by Western banks and governments in the
> postwar era. But now Beijing risks repeating the West?s mistakes ?
> when it allowed massive increases in overseas aid and investment with
> no commensurate adjustments to its foreign policy?. (The Times, 2
> November 2006: ?China and Africa?)
>
> There are undeniably elements of truth in some of this ? some western
> companies are indeed bound by their charters, public pressure and
> voluntary agreements to abide by standards that can reduce their
> competitiveness with companies not thus circumscribed. Bilateral and
> multilateral initiatives on debt, trade and aid have made some
> advances towards greater equity and reparation of injustices. These
> efforts and advances should not be belittled. However, there are
> three main sets of problems with the imagery of a benign west being
> undermined by a ruthless and unscrupulous China. The first is that,
> despite advances, many western companies remain mired in corrupt and
> exploitative business practices. Without losing sight of the
> importance and achievements of incremental improvements in western
> accountability and transparency, they remain inadequate. The second
> problem is that of scope and scale ? the West?s impact on Africa
> cannot be reduced to the efforts of NGOs, aid agencies or companies.
> We must look beyond these limited horizons to debt, unjust trade
> regulations, uneven power in the institutions of global governance,
> the ?war on terror?, and increasingly, perhaps, climate change, to
> develop a better understanding of the West?s impacts on Africa.
> Third, ?development? is almost invariably coded as apolitical and
> positive in these articles ? although interestingly such partiality
> and complacency tended to be situational, apparent when framed within
> the specific China-Africa story. Newspapers and even individual
> journalists who in other reports may be very critical of, for
> example, the halting, late and inadequate provision of medical
> supplies, or debt, or trade inequalities, appear to become less
> critical when the West is framed in the same article as China. Thus,
> while the Australian, French and South African companies may also be
> condemned for working in Zimbabwe, in none of the articles analysed
> were these framed in the same space as a critique of China?s business
> interests.
>
> Running throughout, we can identify recurring words and phrases which
> are indicative of the images outlined above: China is ?guzzling?,
> ?aggressive?, an ?economic juggernaut?, ?insatiably? ?thirsty? for
> oils and minerals, and ?voraciously? capitalist. ?China is prowling
> the globe in search of energy sources? (Declan Walsh, 9 Nov. 2005,
> The Guardian, emphasis added)
>
> ?As a voracious China scours the world for minerals, no regime is off
> limits? (Financial Times, 12 Jan 2006: ?Insatiable Beijing scours the
> world for profit and power?)
>
> ?[China] is ravenous for raw materials?. (The Telegraph, 26 April
> 2006: ?The dragon in Africa?)
>
> In an article headlined ?China?s goldmine: Tony Blair and Bono see
> Africa as a moral cause; China sees it as a business opportunity. But
> is Beijing?s interest based on economic partnership ? or ruthless
> exploitation??, we find:
>
> ?The resurrection of Chambishi [a major Zambian copper mine] is just
> one small example of China?s explosion into Africa. From the barest
> foothold a decade ago an army of diplomats, technicians and
> entrepreneurs has kicked the continent?s door wide open, making
> Beijing a heavyweight investor and political player? (The Guardian,
> 28 March 2006: ?China?s goldmine?, emphasis added)
>
> This position and language stands in contrast to accounts of western
> FDI, which is only presented as an unambiguously positive flow.
> Unlike the West, the Chinese have ?insinuated? their way into the
> continent. For example:
>
> ?Quietly, while the attention of the world has been elsewhere, China
> has become a major player in Africa?. (The Independent, 7 September
> 2006: ?The benefits and dangers of those gifts from the east?)
>
> ?China, which now foresees annual trade with the world?s poorest
> continent totalling $100 billion (?50 billion) by 2010, began
> stepping up its presence stealthily in Africa in the early
> 1990s? (The Times, 25 April 2007: ?From favoured patron to target of
> dissenters?, emphasis added)
>
> Dan Large, at SOAS, argues that these images are indicative of
> western defensiveness about ?it?s backyard?, and can be seen as part
> of a wider reaction to an emerging power. The language of red dragons
> in the continent takes us back to the geopolitical discourses that
> characterised the Cold War.
>
> Conclusions To retiterate, amongst the database of articles reviewed
> there were alternative perspectives and stories, critical accounts of
> western roles and histories, and a recognition of the complex but
> also positive possibilities of greater Sino-African relations.
> However, the themes identified above emerged as strong and pervasive
> scripts in British reporting on the contemporary relationships
> between Africa, China and the West. Africa is one place in which
> China and western nations, notably the US, are likely to find
> themselves in a position of competition, and these images and
> languages, both popular and policy, are significant. In a recent
> analysis, Andrew Still (2005) urges the importance of maintaining
> moderate, pragmatic and respectful language and diplomatic ?signals?
> on both sides, if we are to avoid hardening ideological dividing
> lines between China and the US in particular ? Still talks in terms
> of a potential degeneration of relations that could usher in the next
> Cold War. He suggests that:
>
> ? ? some of the most difficult issues [between China and the US/West]
> lie in the realm of ideas and identity rather than the narrow
> economic and political interests, making them far less tractable. Not
> least of these will be the way in which the debate over ?the rise of
> China? is conducted in the public sphere. The limited repertoire of
> historical analogies on which it currently draws ? creates a
> distorting prism through which the issue is viewed and provides a
> thin basis for more thoughtful analysis of how to ensure a peaceful
> power transition? (Still, 2005, p.3-4)
>
> In the context of what is certain to be growing economic and
> political competition between China and the US (with the UK and other
> nations playing bit parts), including over Africa, media images and
> representations will play an important role in shaping public
> understandings, debates and political pressures. These in turn will
> have consequences ? however negotiated or contested ? for different
> countries, actors and interests in Africa.
>
> * Dr. Emma Mawdsley is a lecturer in geography and Cambridge
> University. This article is a short version of a paper to be
> published in Political Geography in 2008. For a copy of the longer
> version, please refer to the journal, or contact the author on:
> eem10 at cam.ac.uk
>
> *Please send comments to editor at pambazuka.org or comment online at
> http://www.pambazuka.org
> ******
>
> KENYA: ETHNICITY, TRIBE, AND STATE
> John Lonsdale
>
> John Lonsdale argues that key to the post-election crisis in Kenya
> lies in the changing role of the post-colonial state in relation to
> the country's ethnic terms of political trade
>
> The extensive commentary on Kenya's troubles has tended to blame
> ancient tribal rivalry, cynical political calculation, or a
> combination of the two; with the corrupted electoral process seen as
> providing the unintended catalyst - or worse, the deliberate
> instigator that awakens latent tribal hostility. British imperialism
> has also received its expected share of criticism, for inventing the
> now-indigenous Kenyan practice of divide and rule (see Caroline
> Elkins, "What's Tearing Kenya Apart? History, for One Thing",
> Washington Post, 6 January 2008).
>
> While all such explanations have some merit they may also mislead the
> unwary, since they underplay the always slippery relations between
> ethnicity as a universal human attribute, politicised tribalism as a
> contingent process, and the state - any state, colonial or otherwise
> - as a cockpit of variously contested but always unequal power. How,
> then, can a focus on such factors illuminate Kenya's continuing turmoil?
>
> A colonial formation
>
> In the 19th century the area that became "Kenya" was stateless. Its
> peoples' civility, their ethnicity, was shaped by their subsistence:
> farming or herding, or some mixture of both. Such ethnic groups were
> not teams, not "tribes". Loyalties and rivalries were smaller than
> that - patriarchal lineages, marriage alliances, age-groups, trading
> partnerships, client-clusters, and the like. Ethnic groups were
> constituted more by internal debate over how to achieve honour in the
> unequal lives of patron or client, than by solidarity against
> strangers. Ethnic economies indeed were as often complementary as
> competitive, with different specialisms. But such inter-ethnicity -
> which was not without its frictions - was facilitated by the absence
> of any central power that might arrange groups in hierarchical
> relations. Sustained "tribal rivalry" could not exist under such
> decentralised, underpopulated, conditions.
>
> It was European rivalry that imported that modern Leviathan, the
> state, in the late 19th century. It was, like all states, assembled
> by force and driven by self-interest. Its British officials allied
> with African leaders too weak to be rivals; and occasionally did a
> little to rein in the otherwise self-destructive excesses of those
> potentially overmighty subjects, the white settlers. The colonial
> state, responsible to Westminster and at the same time nervous of
> India's viceroy and then (at independence) the country's first prime
> minister Jawaharlal Nehru - since British Indians far outnumbered
> white Britons in Kenya - stood to some extent athwart both Africans
> and settlers, trying to mediate the contradictions between them. Both
> settlers and Africans colonised the state and the facilities it
> provided. What had previously been a multi-polar mosaic of scattered
> nodes of socially productive energy became, within Kenya's new
> borders, a layered pyramid of profit and power, unequally divided
> between two key centres - one "white", one black - and many
> marginalised peripheries.
>
> White settlers got 20% of Kenya's high-potential farmland. As these
> settlers failed to provide enough state revenue and blocked African
> opportunity, the British increasingly encouraged African farming on
> the other 80%. So the second economic centre became Kikuyu-land: home
> of 20% of the population; close to the capital, Nairobi; cool and
> attractive to missionaries, with more schools than elsewhere. By
> geographical accident, then, Kikuyu had a head start in making money
> (essential to advance political ambitions) and in acquiring modern
> managerial skill.
>
> Most nationalisms start among those subjects who do best out of, and
> are most useful to, an ancien regime; their frustrations are keenest,
> their opportunity greatest. Yet while that may explain Kikuyu
> leadership of Kenya's anti-colonial nationalism, it does not account
> for their involvement in Mau Mau, its secretive, violent, offshoot.
> To that point I will return, as it is a key to understanding the
> present.
>
> A social transformation
>
> In the new circumstances, other and not-so-well-placed ethnic groups
> made the most of what they had. They were often driven by a local
> patriotism inspired by vernacular, mission-translated, Bibles that
> told of an enslaved people who became a tribal nation. They embarked,
> in combinations of hope and desperation, on chain-migrations out of
> pauper peripheries (not unlike the Scots or Irish in comparable
> circumstances) to colonise particular niches of employment: on the
> railway; on white farms and plantations; in domestic service; or in
> the police and army. Yet others came to dominate the livestock trade.
>
> Officials and employers exploited these various tendencies and
> stereotyped the supposed ethnic qualities of the group concerned. The
> British helped to harden ethnic divisions made greater by differing
> potentials for social mobility. Britain did not simply divide in
> order to rule.
>
> The emergence of ethnic consciousness also arose from local debates
> about how the genders, generations, rich and poor should relate, as
> older inequalities were transformed into new differentiations less
> sensitive to existing moral audits of honour.
>
> Nowhere was such differentiation so sharp as among Kikuyu. Its
> effects became politically acute after 1945 when settler employers in
> the Rift Valley's "white highlands" mechanised production, and the
> extensive Kikuyu diaspora of tenant-workers in the region refused the
> worsening conditions they were offered. These "ex-squatters", failing
> to recover a home in their increasingly populated, and property-
> protective, "reserves", had to make shift in Nairobi's slums. The
> insistent question, "how then can I live as an honourable Kikuyu?"
> was what separated the militants of Mau Mau from the politically
> conservative, propertied, patrons - led by Jomo Kenyatta - who first
> inspired them.
>
> A political competition
>
> The horrors of the Mau Mau "emergency" war of the 1950s that ensued
> proved the repressive potential of a colonial state too closely
> allied to the settlers, its strongest clients. But the relative
> calmness of decolonisation in 1963 similarly proved the advantages of
> an outgoing state power that was not solely dependent upon its local
> roots - a clear contrast with Rhodesia's fiery end. The post-colonial
> state - rooted in a competitive society, for good historical reasons
> - is once more different. For the state has been the sole agency by
> which Africans could aspire to climb the commanding heights of the
> economy against racially entrenched interests - in land, commerce and
> finance. In recent years it has continued this role by ever more
> devious means, to meet external demands for "liberalisation". Access
> to its power matters. It is concentrated in an executive presidency,
> now directly elected, capable of manipulating all public
> institutions, including a parliament elected from single-member
> constituencies that either singly or in contiguous groups coincide
> with what have become tribal territories.
>
> In consequence, the competition for a share in this power became
> governed by internal ethnic accountability and tribal rivalry.
> President Kenyatta and his Kikuyu elite soothed the frustrated honour
> of their Kikuyu poor with settlement schemes in the former "white
> highlands" (of which the bulk, historically, had belonged to less
> favoured Maasai and Kalenjin groups). His successor Daniel arap Moi,
> finding less room for the poor of own Kalenjin, did more to create
> for them an ethnic elite.
>
> Politicians generally justify their privilege by carving ethnic
> benefits from state largesse. But (in Kenya as elsewhere) this
> extractive approach faced increasing pressures. The ferocity of
> competition for a share of state power rose over time - as population
> has grown, as the fertilising rains of the post-colonial
> Africanisation of opportunity long ago dried up, as the terms of
> trade for primary commodities turned sour. It was fairly easy for
> Kenyatta to ensure that all, more or less, enjoyed a turn "to eat" in
> the ethnic coalitions on which a parliamentary majority relied. It
> was more difficult for Moi. As the political stakes rose, so it
> became more tempting to attract and reward one's ethnic followers
> with officially-deniable opportunities for thuggery at the expense of
> those who were now tribal rivals in land, urban property, or petty
> trade. With every "bought" election, popular anger grew among Kenyan
> citizens - to an extent that they created pressure for a
> constitutional change which would strengthen parliament at the
> expense of the presidency.
>
> A national transition?
>
> A new president, Mwai Kibaki, was elected in 2002 to clean the Aegean
> stables. But in that effort he has disappointed all but his Kikuyu
> cronies. Now, in the presidential election of 27 December 2007, he
> appears to many to have broken the tacit rules of national
> competition - the last straw. That the opposition was, it seems,
> merely less successful in rigging the ballot will not make
> reconciliation any easier. Some of the subsequent opposition violence
> is politically directed. But the worst, by Kalenjin "warriors"
> against Kikuyu "immigrants" into the Rift Valley, may have outrun
> such elite-engineered tribalism to become an eerie echo of Mau Mau -
> in being an internal, generational, ethnic revolt against the
> compromises by which its own recently-manufactured Kalenjin elite
> came to terms with the "old wealth" of Kenyatta's Kikuyu.
>
> There are, then, two very different dynamics currently at work in
> Kenya: internal ethnic dissidence and external tribal rivalry.
> Neither can be disarmed without rewriting the rules of political
> competition for the power of a rather different ("post-post-
> colonial") state. It would have to be less closely allied to its
> strongest clients, and offer its services more disinterestedly to all
> Kenyans. These might in consequence come to think of themselves more
> as citizens, less as ethnically-defined clients. It is a very great
> deal to ask.
>
> Kenya faces two possible futures. On the one hand, the normal inter-
> ethnicity of most daily lives may have been poisoned by the recent
> violence, forecasting a broken state. On the other, the shock may
> have persuaded Kenyan elites of the old, Burkean, truth that a state
> without the means of some change is without the means of its
> conservation. There is perhaps a glimmer of hope in the opposition's
> success in getting its man elected as the speaker of the new parliament.
>
>
> * John Lonsdale is emeritus professor of modern African history and
> fellow of Trinity College Cambridge. This article was first published
> in OpenDemocracy
>
> *Please send comments to editor at pambazuka.org or comment online at
> http://www.pambazuka.org
> ******
>
> THE KENYA CASE AND MEDIA BIAS
> Antony Otieno Ong'ayo
>
>
> While the whole world is aware of the crisis is in Kenya, thanks to
> the international and local media, most of their reporting is
> accurate, however, there is need for an honest analysis of the
> situation in Kenya
>
> The media
>
> It is sad at this moment in time to apply outdated tactics of
> muzzling the people who are expressing a democratic right. In the
> case of Kenya, gagging the media would not help Kibaki and his
> cohorts, since the level of awareness and resolve among Kenyans not
> to return to the dark days of dictatorship is so high. The courage of
> the Kenyan media and journalists despite setbacks initiated by
> Internal security Minster (Michuki) is worth noting, but more so the
> way in which they reported events during the campaigns and eventful
> day of vote counting. However, there are problems with headlines
> (both local and international) that have appeared since the outbreak
> of post elections violence.
>
> The ethnic dimension is appearing to be the main focus of
> international press and they are also reporting that it is a Kikuyu-
> Luo issue but that is not true. Besides the fighting in the slums in
> Nairobi, Nakuru and Mombasa whose inhabitants are from all
> backgrounds though dominated by communities from western Kenya,
> Killings taking pace in the Rift Valley; Coast provinces are not
> perpetrated by the Luos. The fact that Raila is a Luo is not a
> justification enough to tag a whole community, just because one of
> them is a leading personality in the current stalemate.
>
> Such bias will direct attention in the wrong direction, and could be
> used to gang up against other communities, as has been the case in
> the past. There is no mention of killings taking place in Nyanza
> province especially in the Lake Town of Kisumu where Police has been
> shooting protesters at the orders of the internal Security Minister
> (Michuki).
>
> Condemnation of violence should be applied across the board. Victims
> of the violence are from all over especially in the slums, but where
> it is perpetrated by the state in a selective manner, condemnation
> should be focused on security forces and those who give such orders)
> These kinds of statements misinform the world of the actual facts on
> the ground and hinder insights that could help get Kenya out of the
> situation.
>
> Secondly reducing the current post election conflict to a Kikuyu-Luo
> affair is cheap analysis that is devoid of facts and reflections of
> what happens on the ground. Most of the current Western media
> analyses do not taken into account the underlying factors such as the
> failure of institutions of the state, such as the electoral
> commission of Kenya whose mediocre performance has plunged the
> country into bloodshed, a draconian constitutional framework that has
> been at the service of ethnic chauvinists and jingoist in power since
> 1963, the centralised power and networks that benefit from it, whose
> abuse and actions have led to marginalisation of certain groups from
> national resources, equitable public appointments, and the grand
> scheme involving local and international elites who exploit Kenya
> under the ?old order?, interests/forces that want to keep the status
> quo and their role in the current problem.
>
> Bias and partisan analyses are also observed in the local media
> especially the media owners association, Kenya broadcasting
> corporation, Kenyan citizens in the diaspora through various blog
> sites and debaters in the local Newspapers where intellectuals,
> opinion and church leaders have taken sides, instead of guiding the
> debate in a more honest way so that all Kenyans can identify where
> the problem lies (draconian laws, out-dated political system,
> poverty, inequality, corruption, unequal distribution of resources
> countrywide and lack of access to essential services among others).
> Kenyans suffer under these conditions regardless of their tribe, and
> that is why those who live in the slums are from all tribes, even
> though previously marginalized by earlier regimes such as the Luo,
> Luhya and other minority groups make up the majority in those dwellings.
>
> Leadership and national interest
>
> The question that people need to ask is why did Kibaki sought to be
> Kenya?s president, in 1992, 1997, and finally became one in 2002? Was
> it because he lacked money? Was he someone with an agenda for the
> ?whole ? nation?
>
> And if he had one, what was the agenda? Was that agenda realised
> between 2003 and 2007? Why are Kenyans having a problem with his
> agenda presented during the campaigns and the people around him
> majority of whom have been rejected in their own backyards? Why did
> most Kenyans have a problem with giving him another mandate? Why
> would someone who is a billionaire and aged 76, not want to leave a
> legacy that would be remembered in positive terms? What is so painful
> to forego that Kibaki would not want a clean election? More important
> to ask is why the current ?elite? and morons around Kibaki are afraid
> of change of the current system and/or leadership to go into the
> hands of ?lesser? communities? And lastly, why was the current regime
> rejected by majority of provinces and communities? Even though there
> are arguments that Kenya?s economy has grown at 6% over the past two
> years, the gap between the rich and poor has widened, with more
> people falling below the poverty line. The slums did not get smaller,
> nor did North Eastern and North-Eastern provinces get piped water
> from lake Victoria, the Samburus did not receive hospitals and tarmac
> roads, no fish industry was built along Lake Victoria and loans given
> to fishermen. 40 years is a long time for the Samburu, Turkana,
> Rendile and Somalis to wait for basic and essential services to reach
> them, it is a long time for Kamba people to wait for water and
> receive food hand outs during starvation, it is a long time before
> the fishermen along Lake Victoria receive funding through a fishing
> Board to take care of their interests in agriculture as done to
> coffee, tea, pyrethrum and dairy farmers; it is along time to wait
> for any major industry in Western Kenya; it too long time for
> Mijikenda to have resources from Coastal investments recycled back to
> alleviate their poverty, thirst for water, better schools and hospitals.
>
> Obstacle to dialogue
>
> In my view Kibaki is hostage to a number of factors that seems to
> contradict his call for putting the nation first. First and foremost
> are the networks of buddies and business comrades and elite form Mt
> Kenya who have been on the Gravy train since 2003. For what explains
> the refusal to find a middle ground while knowing so well that the
> outcome of the elections are not acceptable to everyone including
> their own people? The people holding Kibaki hostage are the ones
> Kenyans need to address in their quest for finding a peaceful
> solution to the current crisis. These people have a lot to loose if
> the man goes, thus the reason they are against recount, judicial
> review or re-run of presidential elections. Kenyans regardless of
> their ethnic background come distant in their priority of needs and
> actions. The opposition also has a role to play in the process and
> that will depend on the kind of proposal they put on table, which
> should be scrutinised by Kenyans since the issue at hand is about how
> Kenyans are governed and therefore Kibaki or Raila are just but
> people they expect to govern them through their mandate which
> includes listening to their views and respecting their will as
> expressed through the social contract via the vote and representative
> democracy.
>
> A Government of National Unity, or a recount of ballots papers will
> not solve any problem. It is a well-known fact that ballot papers
> especially those used for tallying presidential votes were already
> tampered with and might mot be traced. Secondly Keep never keeps any
> promise. He did not keep his promise to Kenyans after he made
> promises upon election in 2002; he never honoured agreements with his
> comrades upon enthronement, he renegade on the fight against
> corruption, poverty and tribalism. He does not have the will to keep
> his promises therefore arrangements such as a government of national
> unity will just be a soft landing for him, it will be a process that
> legitimises his hold onto power at the expense of democracy and the
> will of Kenyans who came out to vote on the 27^th December 2007.
> Kibaki and his handlers, do not care about democracy, it is a word
> they use at their convenience. The best arbitrator in this case is
> the voter. All mediators coming to Kenya should not let Kenyans down
> by proposing frameworks that will maintain the status quo. It will be
> a mockery to democracy and great betrayal to the many Kenyans who
> have lots their lives since the 50s, to liberate the country from
> colonial yokes but also from the yokes of fellow Kenyans such as
> Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki.
>
> The Killings
>
> Kenyans should stop Killing each other. The culprits are few people
> who are out busy with self-aggrandisement at the expense of a whole
> nation.
>
> Although the current killings are unacceptable since they are an
> outcome of a stupidity of failure by Kenyan politicians to grasp the
> communality interest, Kenyans and more so those who abuse the
> political system and state institutions and resources should know
> that "Kenya belongs to all who belong in it" and all should be given
> equal treatment. There is no justification for the minister of
> internal security to use outdated and counterproductive tactics of
> targeting specific ethnic groups with paramilitary force and orders
> to kill. The images on television screens, shows that most of these
> people could be apprehended and taken to court.
>
> Senseless beating and shooting based on orders of a politician with
> colonial hangovers will exacerbate acts of revenge instead of
> resorting to the rule of law to settle disputes or address acts pf
> violence that are currently being perpetrated by some Kenyans who
> exploit the chaotic situation. The paramilitary police used by
> Michuki on the Luo (historical tactic, used by Kenyatta, in the 60s
> and early seventies) is selective and directed in one direction
> towards a group of people but that too will create more anger and
> feelings for revenge.
>
> Struggles in the Rift Valley are also about past wrongs against the
> minority communities like Ogieks who were chased out of the forest
> and the places given to the central province groups. Maasai and
> Kalenjin whose prime land were taken by the British, and later by the
> elite around Kenyatta. These grievances have never been addressed and
> due to the complex nature of ethnic blend in those regions, Moi for
> instance exploited this mix to cause chaos in order to vilify the
> onset of multiparty in Kenya. Ethnic clashes in 1992 and 1997,
> produced suffering and anger which have been kept low, but now fully
> exploited in the face of a dashed hope for change. These people
> thought there could be some equity with change of government but that
> hope is gone, so we expect anger, but also revenge as result of past
> clashes that were instigated by Moi prior to 1992, and 97 elections.
>
> Democratic test What I fear most is that if Kibaki is allowed to
> rule, Kenya will return to the dark ages, all the democratic gains
> will be lost. They will know that they can always rig elections and
> get away with it no matter what people do including protest, they
> don?t mind whether people die or not, since they will be able to get
> away with it.
>
> Kibaki?s behaviour in relation to vote tallying and results in the
> 2007 elections makes democracy look sick in Africa. It brings to mind
> the question whether there are free and fair elections? Or whether
> franchise or high voter turn out as witnessed in Kenya can turn a
> regime out of office? What about the role of institutions to support
> such a process like an independent police, electoral commission,
> judiciary and a parliament that is sensitive to the needs of the
> country, free and non-partisan media, respect for the rule of law by
> all parties involved in the electoral process? Even though democracy
> has never been perfect although being adopted by nations and peoples,
> its institutionalisation depend more on local history, culture and
> geography and not analyses and prescription as it is applied in other
> contexts. In the case of Kenya, the political, economic and social
> systems are complex and full of nuances, combined with other forces/
> vested interests/pressure groups that exert more power, thus making
> the ordinary voter appear to be a pawn rather than a "king" maker.
>
> Therefore if Kenya is to build on the already made gains on the
> democratic front, a solution to the current crisis must be found in
> tandem with the reality on the ground. The reality that the
> ?presidential election was rigged? and the incumbent is hell-bent on
> hanging to power no mater what cost, but also the reality that the
> opposition is making claims which have been proved right by the
> electoral commission itself and the various poll observers that
> Kibaki did not win the elections?. Although, calling for peace or on
> the major players to urge their supporters to clam down is a first
> step, but the call for peace should not water down the main cause of
> the problem which is ?rigged elections? which is a threat to
> democratic gains. Being soft on this point would embolden the
> antagonists especially the ?winners? and based on their history of
> arrogance and lack of decorum in addressing national issues, they
> will brush aside the issue at stake and this will fuel anger which is
> not only expressed by the opposition, but the very people the winners
> want to ?rule? at all cost.
>
> Way out
>
> Asking Raila or Kenyans to forget this and forge ahead, and wait for
> another 5 years by many partisan authors in various local dailies and
> international blogs is not sincere and honest since such calls are
> directed at one party and not the other two. Why are people not
> asking Kibaki to resign? Why not ask for recount and audit of the
> votes? If the Electoral commission is not honest, how sure can we be
> of the courts in Kenya? Kenyans know that the system is rotten thus
> the overwhelming vote and a clear message that they want something
> different. They should not be denied this difference by hiding behind
> discourses that keeps on mystifying the problem. If Kibaki goes on
> without the approval of Kenyans, he is not making it better for those
> already hurt in one way or the other through killings and destruction
> seen in the past days. These things will haunt the nation after he is
> long gone and people around him or groups supporting him will not
> escape blame and demands to be held accountable. Peace can only come
> when the two parties agree to talk, engage and get into a process
> that will heal wounds on both sides of the divide (the people, the
> Opposition and PNU politicians). Allowing Kibaki to go ahead and bury
> his head as if nothing serious has happened will only exacerbate the
> arrogance of the group around him as witnessed during a recent press
> conference and the exchange between PNU Ministers and the press. Such
> one sided approach and attack on the opposition will only help
> strengthen the status quo, the exploitation, discrimination and
> inequality along tribal lines, which will exacerbate problems even if
> calmness would return today.
>
> What is urgently needed are; Curfew in Opposition areas to be lifted
> and regular police patrols with a humane face be initiated in hot
> spots to give people confidence in the state institutions for their
> safety. The general service unit has no role in the process since it
> is a catalyst instead of providing safety.
> The Kenya Pipeline Corporation should immediately resume pumping oil
> to western Kenya and Uganda. Cutting this supply is not different
> from scorched earth policy and if someone in the government has
> ordered such action, which was observed already before the election
> days then he/she or they are fueling the crisis instead of solving
> it. This should apply to other services like electricity, food items
> among others Kenyan civil society organisations, Law Society, The
> Kenya National Human Rights Commission and invited institutions to
> help in the process of reconciliation and putting in place a
> framework that would bring back the credibility of the electoral
> process and an acceptable conclusion A re-run of presidential
> election supervised by a team of independent observers and
> representatives of the two parties (ODM and PNU) within an agreed
> time frame. It is now clear from ECK that they did not know who won.
> The ECK had put aside funds for a run off, and that money can be used
> to SAVE KENYA.
>
> * Antony Otieno Ong'ayo is a Researcher in the New Politics Programme
> at the Transnational Institute
>
> *Please send comments to editor at pambazuka.org or comment online at
> http://www.pambazuka.org
> ******
>
>
>
> /\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\
> 3 Pan-African Postcard
> PARACHUTE JOURNALISM AND THE KENYAN CRISIS
> George Ogola
>
> George Ogola decries the simplistic western approach to covering news
> on Africa, as exemplified by the reporting of the Kenyan post-
> election crisis
>
> They were probably the longest days of my life. Red-eyed from lack of
> sleep and desperate for updated information on the Kenyan elections,
> I meticulously watched international TV networks and spent hours
> surfing the net for relevant sites covering the elections. I could
> sense curiosity turn into anxiety then fear before an unprecedented
> implosion. Kenya was at war with itself.
>
> The Economist called it ?a very African coup? while Raila Odinga
> called it ?a civilian coup?. Both PNU and ODM claimed victory.
> Confusion reigned as chaos erupted. Months of excitement had turned
> into uncertainty for some and distress for others. But as I agonised
> with my people, there was a parallel drama unfolding.
>
> When controversy over the presidential elections threatened to
> destroy our fragile nation-state, ?parachute? journalists descended
> on Nairobi eager to cover yet another ?trouble spot? in the blighted
> continent. As the country went to the polls, Africa collectively had
> no more than tickers in the major international news channels.
>
> A week prior to the election, only Al-Jazeera had taken some trouble
> to tell the Kenyan story. Reuters Africa proved another notable
> exception. But the familiar would soon follow, vicious and unrelenting.
>
> When protests met the announcement of the presidential results, CNN,
> BBC 24 and Sky News sent some of their finest to Nairobi. But the
> frame of reference had been pre-determined. A narrative had been
> established. Kenya had descended into tribal anarchy reminiscent of
> the Rwanda genocide.
>
> Neighbours had turned onto each other just because they belonged to
> different tribes. ?Tribal violence? became the definitive mantra and
> was the basis for reports across the world.
>
> I recall a BBC 24 news anchor asking a reporter when the results were
> announced whether a military coup was an immediate possibility.
>
> Meanwhile, pundits were carefully selected. As a rule, they were
> middle class white folk mostly ex-diplomats previously based in
> Africa and ?respected? London-based Africanists working with the
> city?s many ?Think-Tanks?. There was the occasional African
> interviewed on a late night show. The frames of reference could not
> be destabilised.
>
> People were being targeted and killed indiscriminately by tribal
> mobs. The savagery both in the deed as well as coverage was taken to
> new heights when a Church was set ablaze in Eldoret killing more than
> 40 people.
>
> International reporters flew to the town and milked the tragedy. They
> reconstructed the gory scenes, the savagery unbeknown to man since
> Rwanda. Footage of rotting corpses in maize fields and overflowing
> morgues were aired without reservation. The dead were denied dignity.
> If you were Kenyan, you cried; and I wept. But I cried for my country
> as well as the job I love.
>
> The kind of coverage I saw on Sky, BBC 24, Euro News and a host other
> channels was not magnanimity. I was convinced it was not a desire by
> a section of the international media to tell the world the true story
> about the conflict that was slowly consuming Kenya. This was about a
> good story; it was about the exploitation of a people crying out for
> help.
>
> It was equally about a western anthropology that figures conflict in
> Africa only in tribal terms; an Africa whose existence is so basic it
> must not be understood beyond the discourse of the tribe.
>
> I witnessed the power of a selective morality that tends to view
> Africa from a paradigm of difference, a unique rationality that
> embraces the kind of savagery the world was witnessing.
>
> Feature stories, commentaries and editorial pieces revelled in
> descriptions of gore; of eyes gorged, bodies burnt beyond
> recognition, of limbs severed with machetes. The description sounded
> more like a sport. Context and detail was ignored as the number of
> deaths became fodder for good stories.
>
> Highbrow newspapers suddenly became tabloids with pictures of fleeing
> Kenyans, children sleeping rough and lines of women with bowls
> queuing for food making the cover pages. TV news anchors asked
> reporters on the ground how many were starving, how many more had
> been killed, and how many more villages had been razed.
>
> Helicopters were more useful flying over burnt out villages to
> capture footage of frightened villagers than provide assistance. When
> many news channels heard whiff of planned protests, the question was
> not what it was about but how violent it would be. The threshold of
> death was continuously being revised, indeed rewritten.
>
> Amid this, the obvious was deliberately being negated. Why was
> violence in Nairobi largely restricted to the slums of Kibera and
> Mathare? Was it possible that the Kenyan poor were at war with the
> rich and with themselves, though speaking in a voice that is anathema
> to a revolution? Why was violence so seductive? Why were the middle
> classes marooned in their suburbs, silent and invisible?
>
> Why was the violence so vicious in the rural areas and especially in
> the Rift Valley? Was it really possibly that because of disputed
> presidential elections, Kenya would suddenly implode? Was there a
> historical trajectory to this conflict? No, the unambiguity of Africa
> as a problem continent could not be challenged at a time when it was
> such a good story.
>
> The assumption that informs the continent?s interpretation is that
> this is a continent whose civilisation cannot be so sophisticated as
> to have class wars; neither can it justifiably fight for anything
> remotely democratic. I?m still torn between weeping for my country
> and an institution I still love dearly.
>
> * Dr. George Ogola teaches at the University of Central Lancashire
>
> *Please send comments to editor at pambazuka.org or comment online at
> http://www.pambazuka.org
> ******
>
>
>
> /\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\
>
>
> Fahamu - Networks For Social Justice
> http://www.fahamu.org
>
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> End of kictanet Digest, Vol 8, Issue 43
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