[Kictanet] Fw: [governance] Assessment of WSIS Outcomes for Internet Governance

[alice at apc.org]

This analysis is currently available at www.IP3.gatech.edu .

It should soon be available at www.InternetGovernance.org


November 23, 2005

An Assessment of the WSIS-2/Tunis '05 Outcomes

The outcomes of the Tunis World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)
are significant -- and rather surprising.  ICANN emerges from the summit
both unchanged and significantly different.  After WSIS it has a stronger
claim to legitimacy.

ICANN emerged unchanged, in that its institutional structures - most
notably its mechanisms for political oversight - were not amended.  ICANN
continues to operate under the formal authority of a single government, the
US.  Such a unilateral globalization model is a novel arrangement, quite
unlike what is used in other global sectors (e.g. telephony or
communication  satellites.)  The US continues to exercise a kind of
unipolar authority it does not have in physical space.

But ICANN also emerges from WSIS radically different: it is now endowed
with a greater degree of legitimacy.  Over a period of four years the UN
family of nations intensely scrutinized ICANN, Internet governance, and
unilateral US oversight, and they came to a decision: they declined to
change ICANN's structures.  Whereas US control was previously the product
of a unilateral assertion, it is now the outcome of a lengthy process of
scrutiny by all nations.

Thus ICANN's greatest weakeness - its lack of legitimacy and its related
lack of support from governments around the world - is less after
WSIS.  From now on, governments that criticize ICANN are criticizing an
arrangement that they themselves reviewed and left unchanged.

The WSIS decision cannot really be called an endorsement of ICANN.  The
text nowhere mentions ICANN by name, and there is no real declaration of
support.  Still, the UN has decided not to act against the organization,
and this collective inaction is the final word after years of debate.

The Internet Governance Forum
Another important WSIS outcome is the launch of the Internet Governance
Forum (IGF).  Two features characterize the IGF.  First, it is a
multi-stakeholder forum.  Although a creation of the UN, the forum
membership will include more than just UN member states; participating
equally will be entities from the private sector and from civil
society.  Second, the forum has no concrete power.  It is an advisory
body.  Its member will discuss and formulate collective recommendations,
but those recommendations will not carry the weight of policy.

Still, the forum could become powerful.  A forum is a prerequisite for
collective action at the global level, making possible communication,
interest aggregation, bargaining, and decision.  WSIS was itself a forum,
and it made possible certain collective decisions of great political
import.  (For more on the functionality of forums see the article
"Understanding WSIS" in the journal Information Technology and
International Development.)  If the new forum makes continued collective
decision-making possible, it could be a powerful entity.  Its
recommendations could be formalized by national governments.

Still one might ask, what is new about this forum?  ICANN already has
advisory committees for governments and for civil society members, and the
private sector controls its board outright.  Why create another mechanism
for formulating advice? The answer is that this new forum will primarily
have a policy focus.  Whereas ICANN's bodies ostensibly focus on technical
coordination, the IGF will focus on all issues of Internet governance.

This dual arrangement formalizes the questionable division of Internet
governance into two domains: ICANN's domain of technical coordination and
the IGF's domain of public policy.  It risks validating the inaccurate
claim that ICANN is a purely technical body without policy-making content.

Implications: ICANN and IGF
In an earlier analysis entitled "ICANN Reform: Establishing the Rule of
Law" I argued that ICANN needed a legislative mandate.  It now has some of
that. The Tunis documents are a major step in that direction.

The locus of policy making will now shift.  Fundamental disputes about
ICANN's structures of policy-making have been settled (at least for
now.)  The next step is to work within those structures.

WSIS defined two forums for policy making: ICANN, for matters of technical
coordination, and the IGF, for everything else.  In the short term, most
Internet governance activity will switch to ICANN, where debates will occur
within the ICANN structures.  They will focus more on substantive issues
relating to technical coordination.

Of particular note is ICANN's Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC).  The
GAC is the forum where governments have the opportunity to look in on ICANN
decision-making and offer their advice.  It will likely become a much more
important body - perhaps the most important body - in ICANN.  At WSIS
governments made it clear that they want a greater voice in ICANN
decisions, and the GAC will be the vehicle for that.  Thanks to WSIS
governments now know a lot more about ICANN issues, so their participation
should be more informed and effective.

Civil society does not have a strong base within ICANN.  The Non-Commercial
Users Constituency (NCUC) operates at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the multiple
commercial constituencies.  Even weaker is ICANN's At Large Advisory
Committee (ALAC), which is a pale shadow of the earlier user representation
on the board.  Ever since business and technical interests eliminated
elections, civil society participation has been constrained.  Outside of
ICANN, the Internet Society (ISOC) is not a reliable home for civil
society.  Since 2002 business interests control ISOC by virtue of having
rewritten its bylaws in a manner similar to ICANN.  ISOC, however, still
claims to be a civil society organization.  What user organizations are in
ALAC are mostly sub-units of ISOC.  In summary, the situation for civil
society in the post-WSIS ICANN is a major source of concern.

A top priority for civil society should be reforming ALAC. With ICANN
confirmed as the one operational institution for global Internet
governance, civil society should develop a more effective voice
there.  Investing in ALAC and NCUC is one way to achieve that.

The second forum emerging from WSIS is the Internet Governance Forum.  The
IGF can be thought of as a continuation of the WSIS, since it provides a
place for multistakeholder discussion of a very large number of
issues.  The key question here is whether governments embrace it.  With GAC
already established and offering a rich agenda, some governments may
question the utility of a second advisory forum.  Industry interests are
likely to be cool to the IGF, since they have so much more influence in
ICANN.  Civil society, with its weak base in ICANN, may have the most at
stake in the IGF, but they may not be able to make it succeed without the
commitment of those other stakeholders.


Conclusion
Before WSIS ICANN was a sort of Frankenstein organization created in the
basement of the US Department of Commerce.  No formal delegation of
authority from the US Congress authorized its exercise of public
powers.  Nor did its global elections give it legitimacy, since they were
canceled before full implementation.

Now ICANN can claim some degree of public authority.  Many people may
regret the UN's implicit endorsement of ICANN, but no one can easily
dismiss the validity of the process.  ICANN is the same but different.  The
next step in the policy process will be to work within its structures.

There is one additional possibility, not mentioned above, that looms over
Internet governance: technology re-design.  With WSIS leaving ICANN in
place, those dissatisfied with ICANN are likely to move away from a
political strategy.   Instead, they may see more promise in trying to
eliminate the single root.  One example in this trend is the Open Root
Server Network (orsn.org), which is creating a parallel network of servers
that are autonomous of ICANN.  With such innovations in place, the power in
controlling the authoritative root server is reduced. In the near future,
it will be interesting to see how many groups propose technical innovations
that effectively decentralize the root.

References
WSIS Decision: "Tunis Agenda for the Information Society," 15 November
2005, WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev.1)-E

"Understanding WSIS: An Institutional Analysis of the World Summit on the
Information Society," Information Technology and International Development,
published by MIT Press, 2005.

"ICANN Reform: Establishing the Rule of Law," web published analysis.

Articles can be found at www.InternetGovernance.org and www.IP3.gatech.edu.


Author is Hans Klein, Associate Professor of Public Policy at Georgia
Institute of Technology and Partner in the Internet Governance
Project.  The paper benefited from comments by Milton Mueller.

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