[kictanet] Safaricom and Internet Traffic Tampering

[Odhiambo Washington]

I recently had a very traumatizing experience with a client I was
consulting for and whose preferred mode of connection is Safaricom 4G.

For two days I was struggling to figure out why what seemed so obvious (in
my mind) was NOT working with Safaricom while I had tested the same with
JTL and Access Kenya links.

It turned out that Safaricom truly tamper with traffic to the Internet.
This includes even VPN traffic.

This test result presented here is not a surprise to me at all. Safaricom's
DPI (Deep Packet Inspection) systems are so robust and advanced that they
can do ANYTHING with your traffic.

I wrote a private email to Stephen Chege of Safaricom (we all remember him)
but didn't receive even an acknowledgement. The problem I had - with DNS
and VPN still stand unresolved.

And this is why I am always suspicious about the dalliance (for lack of a
better word. I am thinking in Dholuo and translating to English) between
Safaricom and the govt, especially since one of them was given a senior
govt job!



On 23 March 2017 at 09:27, Mose Karanja via kictanet <
kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke> wrote:

> Hello listers.
>
> CIPIT has been conducting network measurements on Kenyan Internet Service
> Providers (ISPs) since June 2016 using assorted techniques. Between 6 – 10
> February 2017, the data indicated the presence of a middle-box on the
> cellular network of one provider, Safaricom Limited (AS33771) that had not
> previously presented any signs of traffic manipulation. Middle-boxes assume
> dual-use character in that they can be used for legitimate functions (e.g.,
> network optimisation) and can simultaneously be used for traffic
> manipulation, surveillance and aiding censorship.
>
> In light of such dual uses, this report makes clear that service providers
> operating middle-boxes must communicate to the public in a transparent
> manner the justification for such activity. This is especially relevant as
> government bodies announce plans to monitor and possibly censor the
> Internet during Kenya’s current electoral processes.
>
> You can download the brief from this link:
>
> http://blog.cipit.org/2017/03/23/cipit-research-reveals-
> evidence-of-internet-traffic-tampering-in-kenya-the-case-
> of-safaricoms-network/#more-5833
>
> -Moses
>
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-- 
Best regards,
Odhiambo WASHINGTON,
Nairobi,KE
+254 7 3200 0004/+254 7 2274 3223
"Oh, the cruft."
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