[kictanet] Manual Backup and Elections 2017: Is the CS ICT Honest

Wed Jan 4 10:44:11 EAT 2017

Hello Listers,
Here's my two cents on this issue:
www.iafrikan.com/2017/01/03/making-sense-of-kenyas-digital-election-conundrum/

There is a lot that technology can do to make the electoral process easier,
looking at Ghana and South Africa. We should have an honest and fact-based
discussion around this matter, especially given how critical it is for our
country.

Regards,
Eric

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On 3 January 2017 at 21:49, John Kieti via kictanet <
kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke> wrote:

> Listers, I missed the submission sessions.
>
> One area we can agree on is that if the imagined/anticipated EVID failure
> can deny a citizen their voting rights, likewise the BVR system carries a
> similar potential to deny a citizen their voting right.
>
> Arguably also, denial of voting rights by EVID failure is less likely (and
> less widespread) than the denial of the same rights brought about by other
> factors such as unreliable access to BVR machines for voter registration.
> This is not to forget other factors such as not having an ID which is a
> requisite for registration
>
> Just some additional 5 cent thoughts.
>
> On Jan 3, 2017 17:07, "Barrack Otieno via kictanet" <
> kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke> wrote:
>
>> Technology as a hindrance to voter rights? Interesting conversation going
>> on.
>>
>> Regards
>>
>> On Jan 3, 2017 1:55 PM, "Watila Alex via kictanet" <
>> kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke> wrote:
>>
>> iebc electronic technology regulations http://www.iebc.or
>> .ke/index.php/2015-01-15-11-10-24/research-publications/item
>> /iebc-ict-regulations-on-use-of-technology-in-elections
>>
>>
>> Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android
>> <https://overview.mail.yahoo.com/mobile/?.src=Android>
>>
>> On Tue, 3 Jan, 2017 at 10:38, Watila Alex
>> <awatila at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
>> SK Macharia: Where there’s no mobile telephones,you can use satellite
>> phones and they are cheaper  #ElectionLawsDebate https://t.co/V26IDADqCv
>>
>> https://twitter.com/citizentvkenya/status/816184858124943360
>>
>> Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android
>> <https://overview.mail.yahoo.com/mobile/?.src=Android>
>>
>> On Mon, 2 Jan, 2017 at 9:47, Emmanuel Chebukati via kictanet
>> <kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke> wrote:
>> Listers,
>>
>> Here is my ideal vision of how the election process should run which may
>> also serve as a summary to this discussion:
>>
>> Step
>>
>> Event
>>
>> Description
>>
>> 1
>>
>> *Voter Registration*
>>
>> *Technology*
>>
>> Biometric data is collected. These systems are off-grid hence no network
>> connectivity is required.
>>
>> 2
>>
>> *Register Clean Up and Distribution*
>>
>> *Technology*
>>
>> After registration, all data should be collated by IEBC to check for
>> redundancies and irregularities. Voters with problematic details should be
>> contacted.
>>
>>
>>
>> Before the election, the complete voter register should be split
>> per-polling station and each chunk copied onto a device. For now, let us
>> call and picture this device as an “external hard disk”.
>>
>>
>>
>> The “hard disk” shall contain the biometric data required to identify a
>> voter at only one polling station – where they registered. After copying,
>> the data on the disk should be hashed and compared with the hash on IEBC
>> servers for integrity purposes. This will be useful on election day.
>>
>> 3
>>
>> *Verify Voters on Election Day*
>>
>> *Technology*
>>
>> Before election day, these “hard disks” should be securely distributed to
>> their respective locations.
>>
>>
>>
>> Before the start of voting, the data on the disk should again be hashed
>> and compared with the hash on IEBC servers. If the hashes are the same, the
>> register is clean and voter verification can begin. If the hashes differ,
>> they should try a backup disk. If the hashes still differ, that polling
>> station will be on hold as they await a fresh voter register to be
>> transmitted from IEBC HQ.
>>
>> 4
>>
>> *Cast Vote*
>>
>> *Manual*
>>
>> Voters pick ballot papers for the different posts and cast their secret
>> ballot for each.
>>
>> 5
>>
>> *Count Votes*
>>
>> *Manual*
>>
>> The key here is that the total number of votes cast should not exceed the
>> number of voters that the biometric devices verified.
>>
>> 6
>>
>> *Transmission of Results*
>>
>> *Technology*
>>
>> After all parties and agents agree on the results, they should be
>> manually entered onto the “hard disk” for transmission. Again, once
>> entered, this data should be hashed.
>>
>> If the polling station has network connectivity, the results should
>> immediately be sent together with the hash. IEBC then verify the hash with
>> the data received and if they match, they approve the results.
>>
>> If the polling station lacks network connectivity, the “hard disk” should
>> be physically and securely transported to the nearest point with network
>> connectivity for transmission from there. After all, the constitution
>> speaks of polling station > constituency > county-level. Agents should be
>> involved until they see “Successfully transmitted” on the screen confirming
>> receipt of results by IEBC.
>>
>> With proper testing (load testing, penetration testing, etc) staff
>> training and sufficient voter education, the above should work seamlessly
>> to deliver a free, fair and credible election. The most effective way to
>> test is by carrying out at least two mock elections/simulations with dummy
>> data to prepare all parties for any eventuality and equip them with the
>> knowledge of how to react.
>>
>> I wish you all a prosperous new year.
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Emmanuel Chebukati
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 30, 2016 at 11:30 AM, Odhiambo Washington via kictanet <
>> kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke> wrote:
>>
>>> Dear Listers,
>>>
>>> I am at that position where I feel very lost. In fact, I feel like I am
>>> quite detached from the reality.
>>>
>>> All along, I have keenly considered this matter that seems to have
>>> divided the country down the middle: *Manual Backup* during the 2017
>>> voting process. From the Jubilee/govt side this is a do or die and so it
>>> must be there. This govt side seems hell-bent on confusing the masses, as
>>> well as the experts like the ICT Community. From the Opposition side, the
>>> agenda seems to be very clear - that of ensuring integrity of the Voters
>>> Register and stopping 'ghost voters' from ever casting their votes.
>>>
>>> That brings us to the famous acronyms - BVI (Biometric Voter Register) /
>>> BVI (Biometric Voter Identification).
>>> Having been to a Voter Registration Centre (later to become a Polling
>>> Station) to register as a voter, I did look at the equipment in use for the
>>> registration process. I saw the laptop which was fitted with a camera and
>>> fingerprints scanner. All these require power to run. I did not dwell on
>>> how they were powered, but probably there was a battery backup somewhere
>>> (besides the electricity) given that they needed to run for a whole day for
>>> several days during the voter registration process. When it comes to the
>>> Elections, they only need to run for about 11 hours. My point here is that
>>> of *Backup Power* should it be that there's electricity blackout and
>>> the built-in batteries can't last the whole day. That backup is very
>>> important.
>>>
>>> However, I did not see any piece of equipment which could suggest that
>>> the equipment in use required any form of connectivity back to some central
>>> server in order to function! Which now brings me to the currently national
>>> debate - Manual Backup during the Poll Day. What is it? Was the CS honest
>>> with his presentation before the Senate/Amos Wako committee yesterday? Does
>>> the CS himself really believe in the content of his presentation? I am
>>> asking that because I watched him and I don't believe him. I actually think
>>> he mislead the committee, and hence the nation at large.
>>>
>>> Someone please prove me wrong. I am at that point where I believe that
>>> the BVR/BVI does NOT require any form of connectivity and so this Manual
>>> Backup being touted by the ruling coalition side, strongly supported by
>>>  the ICT CS is a big lie. WHY?
>>>
>>> My very first answer: Simply put, *when there was no requirement for a
>>> manual backup during voter registration, it goes without saying that there
>>> is NO NEED for on the polling day.*
>>>
>>>
>>> 1. For the issue that is in contention - BVR (used for BVI during
>>> polling) - this is a database that can be (and should be) statically stored
>>> on the equipment for each polling station. We are not supposed to rely on
>>> the Mobile Network to access this voters database. And every polling
>>> station can have two/three laptops/Biometrics scanner/Backup batteries to
>>> ensure that the voter identification doesn't fail.
>>> Some excuse has been fronted about some voters being mechanics, such
>>> that their fingerprints wouldn't be recognized by the BVI systems hence
>>> need for manual identification. My take on that is that every voter must
>>> carry their voter's card on that day. The clerks can check that card number
>>> against the electronic system - enter it, and it will bring the person's
>>> picture, ID number, etc and let him cast his ballot.
>>>
>>> 2. For electronics results transmission (ERT), this is not even
>>> necessary in the first place. We can have the results collated/announced at
>>> the tallying centres after being certified - forms 36A, and such. However,
>>> if the ERT must be done, the data footprint is so tiny that a 2G network
>>> can be used. Besides, it can be an SMS based system, which doesn't require
>>> 3G or VSAT. The results data isn't that large - it can't be in Megabytes to
>>> be sincere. Well, VSAT can be used if they MUST, but this is after the
>>> voting process itself is complete, has nothing to do with BVI.
>>>
>>> The ERT and the BVR/BVI are two distinct systems. That is what I want to
>>> believe. The ERT gets feedback from a manual process - of voters casting
>>> their vote, clerks/agents counting, verifying, and certifying, filling
>>> requisite forms then communicating the same via some customized phones
>>> which are programmed to communicate to a backend system. Am I right on
>>> that??
>>>
>>> Now the big question here is, where do we need this much touted manual
>>> backup where network connectivity is being used as the major reason???
>>>
>>> (a) Citing terrorism and the possibility of Al Shabaab knocking off base
>>> stations seems like well thought out lie meant to cover our eyes! If they
>>> attacked an area, I doubt there will be voting in the 1st place.
>>>      And even so, the network connectivity is not required for BVI so
>>> there is no disenfranchising anyone if there is no manual backup (whatever
>>> that is).
>>>
>>> (b) Citing hacking is neither here nor there for a BVR/BVI system
>>> because it's not being accessed live during the voting. It's a static
>>> database, unique to the polling station, resident on the laptop used by the
>>> clerks. The only hacking that can be done then can only be by an "insider".
>>> Quoting Victor Kapiyo from Social Media, "*I guess it's a question of
>>> trust. Trust in systems and in trustworthy people to do the right thing.
>>> For M-Pesa, or KCSE results, we trust both. For IEBC, I guess the jury is
>>> still out*."
>>>
>>> The main issue is not allowing the dead voters to rise again to vote in
>>> the presidential vote, then disappear. So the important component here is
>>> the BVR/BVI, the credibility of the register and hence the vote.
>>>
>>> At what point does the BVI system require this connectivity they are
>>> talking about, which then necessitates the so called "manual backup"?
>>>
>>> Did the CS ICT lie to the Senate?? Did the CAK lie to the Senate in
>>> supporting the lie from the CS??
>>>
>>> There is insincerity in this whole debate about 'manual backup' and the
>>> ICT community seems to either support it or is simply lost in the pool of
>>> confusion being peddled by politicians.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Best regards,
>>> Odhiambo WASHINGTON,
>>> Nairobi,KE
>>> +254 7 3200 0004/+254 7 2274 3223
>>> "Oh, the cruft."
>>>
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>>
>>
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>> for people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and
>> regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the ICT
>> sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and development.
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> sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and development.
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