[kictanet] Manual Backup and Elections 2017: Is the CS ICT Honest

[Odhiambo Washington]

*"It was noted that CA sent the HR manager Juma Kandie to answer IT
questions".*

Now I understand why I yawned too much while listening to that guy!!

Now I also understand why everything was tailored to mislead - from the CS
ICT presentation.



On 31 December 2016 at 18:20, Mwendwa Kivuva via kictanet <
kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke> wrote:

> I'm glad issues of Internet Governance that we have been advanced on this
> list for the past 5 years have come to bear, and were discussed at some
> level at the Senate committee, but not with any depth deserving the gravity
> of the situation we find ourselves in.
>
> Some questions about Access that cropped up were;
> 1. "Why has CA not utilised USF to fill the gap where there is no coverage
> in the country? " - Senator Mutua Kilonzo
> 2. When will there be full 3G coverage in Kenya?
> 3. What is the state of last mile connectivity of NOFBI to all counties?
>
> Some important statistics that came out from CA were that 94% of the
> country has 2G coverage, but 164 locations in the country do not have voice
> or data. I'm not sure what is the meaning of "locations". It was noted that
> CA sent the HR manager Juma Kandie to answer IT questions. It seems IT is
> not Rocket Science after all, but it goes to show the depth of the answers
> Senate got.
>
> The Chair of The Universal Service Advisory Council (USAC), Catherine
> Ngahu sough to answer some of the questions on USF: She said the fund has
> not been used but 2.3billion will be used to cover unserved locations in
> 2017. She said that operators have refused to bid to covers some areas
> using those funds. That those areas are also unserved by other
> infrastructure like roads, and security. But she also said USF have
> tendered for the locations not covered, and awarded for 78 location out of
> the 164.
>
> I would like a clarification from CA what is ment by "awarded". The USAC
> board should table these documents. Also, this figure 164 is different from
> 214 that CA shared with the list in April 2016.
>
> *Catherine also said "By 2017, it is possible the funds will have covered
> all areas".* With this last statement, I wish her word is her bond.
>
>
> All that said, CA gave us an update on USF in April 2016 ; viz below
>
> </END>
>
> >Alwala, Rachel via kictanet <kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke>
> [image: Attachments]19 Apr
> >to *Rachel*, Mwendwa
> >Dear Listers,
>
> >We appreciate the engagement and wish to provide the following
> clarifications regarding the Universal Service Fund.  >Please note that
> this is based on the questions raised and additional information for your
> understanding.
>
> The Authority within the current FY 2015/16 contracted Intelecon Research
> Ltd of Canada to undertake an ICT Access Gaps Study whose objectives
> were:
>
> •       To engage the industry and other stakeholders / service providers
> to identify the gaps in the ICTs service provision.
>
> •       Conduct an in-depth analysis of communication services in the
> country and map out access gaps in voice, data, broadcasting and postal
> &courier services at sub-location level across all counties in Kenya.
>
> •       To support implementation of initial USF network expansion
> projects, grouping gap areas and special projects (e.g. schools
> connectivity) into optimal lots for purposes of tendering.
>
> •      Develop an interactive portal for regular updates and definition of the
> gaps for each service area giving GPS coordinates for selected USF clusters
> and other socio-economic characteristics.
>
> •       Develop a 5 year USF Implementation Strategy based on projected
> funding
>
> •       Review the existing Operational Manual with a view of aligning it
> with relevant internal procedures of the Authority and procurement
> legislations.
>
>
>
> *The progress made To-date*
>
> •       The consultants have delivered an acceptable Final Access Gaps
> report herewith attached; Developed an interactive portal for regular
> updates by the Authority; Are currently reviewing the USF Operating
> Manual and thereafter develop the 5 year USF Implementation Strategy.
>
>
> From the objectives of the ICT Gaps Study, it is clear the survey did not
> focus on the need to increase the USF levy amount neither did the study
> audit the use of USF funds.
>
>
> It should further be noted that even though the Act that created USF came
> into being in 2009, it was not until in the FY 2013/14 that the Authority
> issued the first USF invoices.
>
>
> As it awaited the legal framework to be in place and fully operationlize
> the Fund, the Authority undertook a number ofpreparatory activities for
> the implementation of USF. These include:
>
> ·     Carrying out a number of studies to guide the implementation of the
> Fund, these included the 1st National ICT Survey (2010/2011) and the ICT
> Access Gaps Study (2011); The Internet Market Study; the 2nd National ICT
> Survey (2016) targeting Public Sector and Business Enterprises covering all
> the 47 counties in Kenya.  The National ICT Survey has been undertaken in
> conjunction with the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) with the
> objective of; establishing ownership, access and usage of ICTs in
> enterprises; measuring the use and access ofICTs by Government employees;
> measuring availability of ICTs in enterprises and public sector
> institutions; measuring supply of e-Government services to citizens in
> Kenya and compute the e-Government development index. The data capture for
> the Public Sector and Business Enterprises has just been concluded and a
> report will be shared with stakeholders.
>
>
>    - The Authority also Implemented a number of Universal Access (UA)
>    pilot projects whose lessons are instrumental in the implementation of
>    USF projects. The pilot projects include: 16 ICT Centers in Secondary
>    Schools (2 in each province), 4 Community Centers, 8 ICT Centers schools
>    for PWDs (covering all secondary schools for PwDs in Kenya), 56 e-Resource
>    Centers within the Kenya National Library Service outlets, E-health Project
>    (implemented in collaboration with the Ministry of Health and Qualcomm
>    Inc), Content Development that include the Digitization of the Kenya
>    Certificate of Secondary School (KCSE) Form I and II curriculum by
>    Kenya Institute ofCurriculum Development (KICD); developed a Web
>    Portal for Persons With Disabilities (in partnership with the National
>    Council for Persons with Disabilities and United Disabled Persons of Kenya(NCPWD);
>    supported the development of National Broadband Strategy (2012) with
>    technical support from USAID’s Global Broadband Innovation (GBI) programme.
>    A number of stakeholders supported the development of the National
>    Broadband Strategy (NBS).  These included the Ministry of Information
>    Communications and Technology, the ICT Authority, the then E-Government
>    Directorate, Vision 2030 Secretariat and National Communications
>    Secretariat and other stakeholders. This strategy is important in the
>    realization of universal access to broadband services in Kenya. These
>    projects have been fully funded by the Authority.
>
> Universal Service Fund (USF) kitty has accumulated KES. 2.94 Billion from
> remittances by licensees while the Authority has contributed KES 1 Billion
> seed money to the fund putting the total collections at KES giving total
> collections to date at KES. 3.94 Billion.
>
> The Access Gaps Study Report (attached) has identified basic services and
> broadband gaps as the two priorities for USFinvestment in the FY 2016/17:
>
>
>    - Infrastructure Projects: Closing the voice gaps in the identified
>    214 sub-locations. This will reduce the population coverage gap from 5.6%
>    of the population to around half (2.8%) by 2018. The USF distributes
>    Funds through subsidies. Since USF subsidies will be distributed on a
>    progressive basis as the awarded Lots are implemented, it is not expected
>    that the USF will distribute more than 67% of the awards made in the
>    first fiscal year of operation (2016/17), thus the final amount
>    distributed in 2016/17 on the voice service project will be approximately
>    US$ 10 M (KES 1 billion).
>    - Broadband Connectivity in Secondary Schools in Kenya. The cost of braodband
>    connectivity is estimated at KES. 500M.
>
>
>
> These priority projects shall be implemented under the accepted guidelines
> of the USF and the existing procurement laws in Kenya which stress on
> transparency and competition in the distribution of funds.
>
>
> *USF Projects Implementation Plan*
>
> The Schools Connectivity project will be designed to run in parallel with
> the ICT Infrastructure (Voice) Project. The schedule of USF implementation
> is as follows;
>
>    - Project Design Report (scheduled for 27th May 2016)
>    - Industry Workshop in the first week of June 2016.
>    - Bidding Documents will be available at end of June 2016.
>    - Awards of tender are expected to be made by early November 2016.
>    - Implementation of the USF projects 2017
>
>
> Kindly note that the Authority is the secretariat to the Univeral Service
> Advisory Council (USAC) and can provide any information required. The CA
> website is updated with news items, publications, so make effort to equally
> follow us on online platforms and achievements to date. Lastly, we wish to
> clarify that the Universal Service Levy imposed under section 84J (3) of the
> Act is to be charged on all licensees offering communication systems and
> services on a commercial basis.  The Act provides for the Levy charged
> on licensees at an amount not exceeding one percent (1%) of the gross
> revenue of a licensee. However, the Authority's Board settled on 0.5%
> after due consultation with the industry. At no point has the Authority
> considered increasing the levy amount since the ICT voice gaps has
> considerably reduced to 5.6%. Any changes in the percentage of contribution
> will be subjected to industry consultations.
>
> Hope this gives you some insights that are helpful.
>
> Regards,
>
> Rachel Alwala
> Assistant Director/Communications and External Affairs
> Communications Authority of Kenya
> PO Box 14448
> Nairobi 00800
> Tel:  +254 703 042000
> Email:  alwala at ca.go.ke
> Website:  www.ca.go.ke
>
>
>
> ______________________
> Mwendwa Kivuva, Nairobi, Kenya
> twitter.com/lordmwesh
>
>
>
> On 31 December 2016 at 14:18, Collins Areba via kictanet <
> kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke> wrote:
>
>> Listers,
>> Allow me to share these wise words from a friend, Ben Ngumi Chege, who
>> has had extensive on the field doing exactly this kind of work in more
>> places than I can remember. Will paste the long text after the link in case
>> its not visible to everyone.
>>
>> https://web.facebook.com/notes/ben-chege/manual-vs-electroni
>> c-elections/10154910551733923?__mref=message_bubble
>>
>> “Manual” vs “Electronic” Elections
>>> BEN CHEGE <https://web.facebook.com/masukuma>·FRIDAY, 30 DECEMBER 2016
>>> <https://web.facebook.com/notes/ben-chege/manual-vs-electronic-elections/10154910551733923>
>>> Every 5 years Kenyans queue to vote, this is an exercise that we have
>>> engaged in passionately for as long as I can remember and when each round
>>> of elections is done and dusted we as a nation learn a couple of lessons
>>> which we then reuse in succeeding election cycles in an attempt to make
>>> them better. However, looking at the current debate on the use of
>>> technology and witnessing what is happening, I suspect that there might
>>> have been an important lesson to be learnt in the 2007-08 when compared to
>>> the 2013 election cycle that has been missed and this lesson is that Having
>>> consensus among all players beforehand regarding the electoral process
>>> generally leads to widespread acceptance of the results of the process.
>>> Electoral process should be seen as contests, where groups of people
>>> with various interests engage willingly in order to not only determine
>>> political representation but also wield the power of the state, and just
>>> like any reputable contest it has its rules. These rules are well known and
>>> understood by all players and are accepted from the onset. These rules are
>>> deterministic in that they are predictable and must be seen by all parties
>>> to be fair. For a country to have a credible election - we need everyone to
>>> feel like they have a chance in this contest since from the onset the rules
>>> of the game do not favour their opponent(s).
>>> In 2007 ODM did not agree to the way the commissioners were picked after
>>> the terms of some expired as they felt it contravened the IPPG agreement
>>> and after the contest was done they did not accept the results announced by
>>> the commission. When the same commission asked them they refused! We all
>>> remember the situation the country found itself after the opposition
>>> refused to engage in a process they felt was flawed and disadvantageous to
>>> them. The 2017 election process is slowly mirroring the 2007 pre-election
>>> period especially when it comes to the role of technology on voting day. We
>>> are witnessing an emotive debate regarding the use of technology and the
>>> disregard of the voices of political players who hold contrary opinions. If
>>> lessons from the past hold true, this threatens the expectation of a
>>> peaceful electoral process and at the very least a credible one.
>>> On voting day there are 4 core activities that happen within a polling
>>> station, these are:
>>> 1) Voter identification/Verification – this answers the question – “Are
>>> you registered to vote in this polling station?”
>>> 2) Voting by secret ballot – you are given a ballot paper and then you
>>> mark it in secret and the cast the said ballot into a transparent ballot
>>> box.
>>> 3) Counting of results and declaration – counting of all votes cast in
>>> the polling station for each race and the declaration of the votes cast in
>>> favour of each candidate.
>>> 4) Results transmission – forwarding these results to the next level
>>> namely the constituency tally center for “tallying” and dispute resolution
>>> just in case there were any.
>>> The “Manual” vs “Electronic” debate is really touching on activities 1)
>>> and 4) and therefore at the core of this debate are 2 questions namely:
>>> 1) Can we solely verify/identify voters electronically using biometrics
>>> that they submitted?
>>> 2) Can we solely transmit results to the next level using electronic
>>> means?
>>> Fortunately, these two are not really new initiatives as the IEBC has
>>> been using technology in these two areas over the last 4 years. No one
>>> doubts the credibility boost that well executed technology has on
>>> elections. An example of this is the by-election in Kibwezi West where the
>>> winner won the race by the narrowest of margins - a paltry 175 votes and
>>> the loser did not file a petition challenging the results. This was unheard
>>> of in previous elections.
>>> Why then do we have a debate around it? Previously, the use of
>>> technology was not explicitly dictated by the Elections Act but rather the
>>> stipulation to use one form of it was found in regulations. Until now the
>>> official Electoral process has been manual where technology had been added
>>> for efficiency and confidence building. The latest Election Amendment Act
>>> 2016 has raised the profile of the said technologies from just being tools
>>> to be used in boosting confidence to be the exclusive means of conducting
>>> voter identification and results transmission.
>>> They say once stung – twice shy and thus it’s understandable that the
>>> IEBC is jittery in embracing technology full throttle without a fallback
>>> especially because it had technology failures in the said areas during the
>>> 2013 General elections. Technology is playing an increasing role in our
>>> lives and for us to move forward on the electoral field - I feel that this
>>> discussion needs to be informed by a mindset from big technology companies
>>> have when it comes to failure. Companies like Google, Yahoo and Facebook
>>> plan for failure more than they plan for success. They have a culture that
>>> says “failure is OK”, a culture where people are encouraged to ask:
>>> 1) What do we do if our technology fails?
>>> 2) How do we continue fulfilling our core business that is serving our
>>> customers and users when the systems around us fail?
>>> So as Kenyans we need to ask ourselves the same set of questions and ask
>>> how it affects the core business of elections. But for that to happen we
>>> need to synthesize what our core business on election day is. It’s said
>>> that “Election Day is still the one day when we strive to give equal
>>> voice to every eligible voter; the day when the woman working in the market
>>> stall has as much of a say as any wealthy banker, and the illiterate menial
>>> laborer has a voice that speaks as eloquently as any university professor.
>>> It is our shared responsibility to strive for processes and systems that
>>> ensure that every voter is given the opportunity to make their will known,
>>> and that every vote is counted.” If we agree that this is the core
>>> business of elections and everything on election day must support this, we
>>> should ask ourselves a couple of questions, namely:
>>> 1) What happens WHEN we place a piece of technology as a prerequisite to
>>> the recording of this voice and the said technology fails and thus affects
>>> the “core business”? What are the fallbacks available to us?
>>> 2) Since this is a contest, which out of the array of fallbacks
>>> available is most acceptable to all players?
>>> The issues around the failure of technology have been well documented.
>>> The IEBC conducted an internal audit of the March 2013 election and rather
>>> candidly highlighted these failures. I will try and address them and
>>> possibly give recommendations in question form that should advise our
>>> choice of an acceptable fallback or perhaps a list of fallbacks to be
>>> executed in when certain scenarios playout. When it came to the
>>> identification of voters electronically, the issues fell broadly into 3
>>> categories namely:
>>> 1) Technology problems – some voters could not be found on some EVIDs
>>> but were present on the manual register. Some devices run out of power,
>>> some even exploded during charging
>>> 2) Procurement problems – getting the wrong device because procurement
>>> requirements were not met.
>>> 3) Rollout problems – some devices were not charged, insufficient
>>> training due to late delivery and lack of manuals e.t.c.
>>> With proper planning and time to go through the procurement procedures
>>> most of these can be sorted out. The new Elections amendment act stipulates
>>> that the IEBC should have procured and set in place technology 8 months to
>>> an election and then have it tested 60 days to an election. Even with this
>>> in place some of the problems categorized as “Technology problems” may not
>>> disappear or may only manifest themselves on polling day. In order to
>>> address them we need to ask ourselves what are the real risk factors
>>> related to technology? If the approach to voter verification is similar to
>>> what was employed in 2013 – then the disruption of telecommunication is not
>>> a potential failure point – why? The devices were self-contained – the
>>> register was loaded on the device and thus the device really had no need to
>>> communicate with external systems after rollout. If this is the model
>>> envisaged in the new KIEMs Rollout – we should not concern ourselves with
>>> telecommunication availability in the matters of voter verification. What
>>> should concern us is the issue of availability of power as the devices will
>>> be constantly in use throughout the day. The devices used for verification
>>> conduct a one-to-one match of voters against their biometrics –
>>> computationally – it can be a costly affair especially if a potential voter
>>> has to submit multiple fingers to get identified if one fails and so we
>>> need to have devices that can work for 18 hours or have capability to
>>> accept external power in the form of portable power cells. Can the software
>>> be written in such a way that it alerts the users well beforehand that it
>>> has X number of hours of charge left and that the clerks at the polling
>>> station need to make arrangement to keep the electronic means working?
>>> Ghana deployed a solution that utilized dry cells and they put in place an
>>> operational plan to replace them within 4 hours.
>>> The issue of some voters not being found on the EVIDs yet being found on
>>> the manual roll was puzzling, this may be aggravated in 2017 this is
>>> because the bulk of the current set of fingerprints were collected in 2013
>>> and it will not be farfetched to expect that the quality of fingerprints
>>> submitted for verification in this election cycle by an eligible voter who
>>> work with their hands to be lower and thus this may require multiple
>>> passes. The current setup is one which a subset of the fingerprints
>>> collected is used to verify voters electronically. If we are to go full
>>> throttle – we will need to ensure that all fingerprints are available for
>>> matching on polling day to increase the chances of matching. An exercise to
>>> get fingerprints resubmitted for persons who fall in this category and also
>>> for all those that had their biometrics lost during the mass registration
>>> drive when BVR machines crashed and did not have backed up properly.
>>> Another reason that could explain why some voters were not found on the
>>> EVIDs and were found on the printed register is data corruption during
>>> copying polling station data into the SD cards that the devices used. How
>>> can we ensure that databases are not corrupted during saving into the
>>> machines? I propose that each device should have a way of hashing a file
>>> and checking the hash against a verified hash of a working copy and where
>>> it differs transferring data to this device should be repeated. Backups of
>>> these registers on verified SD cards should also accompany each EVID to the
>>> field. We should explore how to keep the logs of the persons who have voted
>>> safe when devices get technology issues. There is also an inconvenient
>>> reality that in any given population there will always be some persons
>>> whose fingerprints are difficult or impossible to capture or verify. This
>>> raises a fundamental ideological question of whether a person should be
>>> disenfranchised because of limitations of a technology.
>>> The issues around the provisional transmission of results were also well
>>> documented, these also fell into 3 broad categories namely:
>>> 1) Technology problems – the server’s well documented issue with system
>>> logs and it running out of space due to server misconfiguration; The
>>> failover issues that followed this. Network coverage issues; Erroneous
>>> display of tallied votes due to late integration and limited retesting.
>>> 2) Procurement/Acquisition problems – there was no time to really
>>> develop the transmission application.
>>> 3) Rollout problems – late delivery of phones and specially configured
>>> simcards; issues with user credentials; versioning issues between server
>>> and phone; Lack of proper training.
>>> As with electronic voter identification, most of these can be sorted out
>>> with proper planning and following procedures, why do I say so? the IEBC
>>> has transmitted 100% of the results from all the by-elections that it has
>>> conducted since 2013. While in terms of scale these by-elections pale when
>>> compared to the general election, it’s my considered opinion that there
>>> have been numerous lessons learnt – these can be documented and used to
>>> inform the training and rollout process.
>>> What should happen in the event that result transmission fails for
>>> whatever reason? The IEBC still needs to have a fallback for electronic
>>> results transmission. Can some other technology offer a fallback? e.g. If
>>> results transmission from a primary device fails, should we have an
>>> electronic fallback using a different technology? Can the current election
>>> transmission system be used as a backup of whatever fancy results
>>> transmission system the IEBC procures? The IEBC has used satellite phones
>>> with success to transmit results for the Kalolol and Mosiro by-elections,
>>> why can this be used as a fallback on the telecommunication side. I think
>>> we can have all these fallbacks in place and these would be totally
>>> acceptable to all stakeholders.
>>> These questions are by no means comprehensive but should act as a
>>> starting point in deciding what the fallback(s) should be and when to
>>> fallback. It has always been my opinion that leaving the determination of
>>> important electoral matters at the polling station level to the discretion
>>> of people there without a trail of documentation that guides their decision
>>> making and a trail of accountability to why they took the action they did
>>> exposes the election operation to credibility questions. In 2012 Ghana went
>>> into their election with the NVNV (No [biometric] Verification, No Voting)
>>> mantra and they had to extend the voting period and also had many people
>>> disenfranchised because of the inadequacies of the technology they rolled
>>> out. In 2015 they rolled back and then introduced a manual verification
>>> fallback. The manual verification process required the presiding officer
>>> fill a manual verification form for each voter who is manually verified.
>>> The only way we can come up with this list of scenarios is if we carried
>>> out a proper and candid risk assessment and management process. This
>>> process should inform the IEBC on what to do to ensure that the “core
>>> business” on election day remains unaffected. From my perspective, human
>>> beings should always play the role of final "exception handlers" to ensure
>>> that during electronic voter identification no voter is ever
>>> disenfranchised by technology malfunction or it’s limitation. Indeed, if
>>> the electoral process must err, then it must err on the side of inclusion.
>>> However, these errors must be accounted for and thus the most appropriate
>>> role of technology is to ensure a level of transparency and accountability
>>> that allows for review of any of those human decisions on how to handle
>>> exceptions. As noted earlier on this paper, the process used for
>>> verification involves a one-to-one match of voters against their
>>> biometrics. The voter gets his ID No. captured by the verification device
>>> in a bid to ‘identify’ them and once their records are loaded on the screen
>>> of the device an additional fingerprint scan is required to ‘verify’ this
>>> person. i.e. answering the question – are you really the person who you
>>> claim to be? So, for example, if the validation device is unable to verify
>>> the fingerprint of a voter who the presiding officer knows or strongly
>>> believes to be a legitimate voter, and his/her particulars are on the voter
>>> register, the presiding officer should have the authority to override the
>>> device and allow the person to vote. In order to trigger the manual
>>> verification process, the presiding officer should collect as much
>>> information about the person being excluded from being electronically
>>> verified as possible. This information should include a photo of this
>>> person and the Serial Number not ID No. found on their National Identity
>>> card. Manual verification should not be misconstrued to mean manual
>>> verification using the physically printed out register or green books. This
>>> process should be endorsed by all party agents present at the polling
>>> station. It is important to have this information both in physical and
>>> electronic form. At the end of the day, any final reconciliation should
>>> include the number of decisions the presiding officer made contrary to the
>>> technology. This allows for review of the decisions of the presiding
>>> officer, and provides a deterrent since that officer knows that there will
>>> be an accounting of how many decisions he made of this nature. It also
>>> allows for reporting on anomalies where a polling station or ward has an
>>> inordinately high number of human exceptions. This information can be
>>> transmitted periodically so that during the course of the day to all
>>> stakeholders and thus all players are able to identify polling stations
>>> that have inordinately high numbers of human exceptions and vigilance can
>>> be increased to ensure only legitimate cases are excluded from electronic
>>> verification.
>>> Once this discussion has been held and we have a product that this has
>>> the blessing of all players contesting in the election. When accepted by
>>> all stakeholders the post-election process of massaging bruised egos and
>>> selling peace i.e. the 'accept and move on' message will be much easier.
>>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> kictanet mailing list
>> kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke
>> https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet
>>
>> Unsubscribe or change your options at https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/m
>> ailman/options/kictanet/kivuva%40transworldafrica.com
>>
>> The Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) is a multi-stakeholder platform
>> for people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and
>> regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the ICT
>> sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and development.
>>
>> KICTANetiquette : Adhere to the same standards of acceptable behaviors
>> online that you follow in real life: respect people's times and bandwidth,
>> share knowledge, don't flame or abuse or personalize, respect privacy, do
>> not spam, do not market your wares or qualifications.
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> kictanet mailing list
> kictanet at lists.kictanet.or.ke
> https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet
>
> Unsubscribe or change your options at https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/
> mailman/options/kictanet/odhiambo%40gmail.com
>
> The Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) is a multi-stakeholder platform
> for people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and
> regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the ICT
> sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and development.
>
> KICTANetiquette : Adhere to the same standards of acceptable behaviors
> online that you follow in real life: respect people's times and bandwidth,
> share knowledge, don't flame or abuse or personalize, respect privacy, do
> not spam, do not market your wares or qualifications.
>



-- 
Best regards,
Odhiambo WASHINGTON,
Nairobi,KE
+254 7 3200 0004/+254 7 2274 3223
"Oh, the cruft."
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/pipermail/kictanet/attachments/20161231/61fd63d4/attachment.htm>